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ABSTRACT 
The concept of the food stamp program-as a 
Federally-sponsored relief measure has changed internally 
since its inception in 1939.  First begun during the New 
Deal and later revived in 1961, the pilot projects were 
acclaimed as a successful way to provide food relief. 
During the 1960's, with an increased public concern over, 
hunger in the United States, the food stamp program 
became a topic of political debate.  Further expanded in 
the early 1970's, increases in program participation led 
to administrative problems, soaring costs, and 
allegations of fraud.  In 1977, the Carter administration 
backed an extensive revision of program operations.  This 
reform was not successful, however, as increased 
participation, continued fraud, and rising costs 
attested.  In the 1980's the Reagan administration has 
tried to halt program growth.  Yet despite several cuts, 
the food stamp program remains this nation's largest and 
most troubled relief program. 
INTRODUCTION:  FOOD STAMP PROGRAMS 19 39-1964 
"We do not know how many people there may be who are 
hungry.  We also do not know why there is hunger in this 
country, to whatever extent it exists, at a time when the 
Federal Government, state and local governments and 
private organizations are spending more on food 
assistance than ever before in history."   These recent 
words of Edwin Meese reflect a national concern over the 
existence of poverty in our own land.  The popular, 
discovery of poverty in the United States only occurred 
in the 1960's, but with that discovery came controversy 
over whether the Federal Government was doing enough to 
alleviate it.   One way the government has attempted to 
abate hunger has been through the Federal food stamp 
program, America's largest initiative for feeding its 
needy.  Rapid growth in expenditures from $15 million to 
1 
Robert D. McFadden, "Comments by Meese on Hunger 
Produce a Storm of Controversy," The New York Times, Dec, 
10, 1983, p. 12. 
2 ^ Michael Harrington, Introduction to The Other 
America (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1969). 
$11 billion a year has made it the target for allegations 
of mismanagement, fraud and spiralling costs. 
Consequently the food stamp program as a valid relief 
mechanism has been the focus of sharp political debate. 
This essay will examine first the program's beginnings to 
1964 and then concentrate in the following chapters on 
the development of the program from 1964 to the present. 
The present Federal food stamp program is based on a 
1961 pilot program.  The provisions of^Section 32 of the 
sir 
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1935 authorized this 
undertaking. Section 32 stipulated that thirty.percent of 
the receipts from U.S. Customs could be used by the 
Secretary of Agriculture to "encourage the exportation of 
agricultural products," to "encourage the domestic 
consumption of such commodities by diverting them, by 
payment of benefits or by other means, from the normal 
channels of trade and commerce," and to "finance 
adjustments in the quantity planted or produced for 
3 
market of agricultural commodities." 
Under this authority the Department of Agriculture 
first conducted a food stamp program from 1939 to 1943. 
As part of later New Deal relief efforts, this innovative 
3Public Law 74-320, Statutes at Large 49, Sec. 32, 
744. 
program grew out of the mounting^ dissatisfaction'with^ 
•i 
previous surplus food distribution techniques.  Regarded 
favorably by the press and public, the new program was 
accepted as a means to aid farmers and businessmen as 
well as the unemployed.  According to an official 
description of the 1939 food stamp plan: 
It broadens the market for food products, 
thus helping the farmer. 
It provides more adequate diets for 
needy families, thus helping the consumer 
and building of our national health 
defenses. 
It moves all surplus commodities through 
the regular channels of trade, thus helping 
business. 
^   Originating in Rochester, New York in 1939, the 
program extended to five other experimental areas. 
Although it never functioned on a national basis, *1,744 
counties and 88 cities participated and the total number 
of people receivings aid reached 4,000,000.  The 
participants, who were certified by various relief 
agencies, consisted of families receiving some form of 
public assistance. 
4 U.S., Department of Agriculture, Eating the Surplus^ 
Through the Food Stamp Plan, pamphlet, March 1941, p. 1. 
Cited in Kenneth Clarkson, Food Stamps and Nutrition 
(Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for 
Public Policy Research, 1975), p. 10. 
U.S., Congress, House, Establishment of a Food 
Stamp Plan, H.R. 2358 to accompany H.R. 13067, 85th 
Cong., 2nd sess., 1958, p. 2. 
</> 
 Under—the- 19 39 plan-, an—el-i-gi-ble- familywould buy  
"general" food stamps (orange stamps) in amounts .. 
approximately equal to its average grocery expenses. 
These stamps could then be used for the purchase of any 
» 
food item.  Additionally, each family obtained 
"specific-purchase" food stamps (blue stamps) equivalent 
to half the amoun£ of orange stamps.  Blue stamps could 
only be used to purchase foods designated as surplus and 
published in a monthly list by the Department of 
Agriculture.  About thirty commodities, including pork, 
fresh vegetables, fresh and dried fruit, dried beans, 
cereals, potatoes, and butter usually appeared on these 
1-4.     6 llz-StS . 
Due to constant changes in the lists of foods tfiat 
could be purchased with blue stamps, administrators fobnd 
this two-stamp system cumbersome.  The Government 
gradually terminated the program during World War II as 
unemployment declined and global demand for U.S. food 
increased.  The total cost of the 1939-1943 program was 
approximately $260,000,000. 
The stated basic objectives of this early food stamp 
plan had been to help the farmer by broadening markets, 
Ibid., pp. 2-4. Clarkson, p. 10. 
7 '           < U.S., Congress, House, Establishment'of a Food 
Stamp Plan, p. 2. 
to help the needy, and to help business by moving surplus 
commodities through regular channels of trade.  Clearly, 
however, it was above all a measure intended to help 
raise farmers' incomes.  The increase of food consumption 
among the nation's needy was a secondary consideration. 
Yet for farmers the effects of the food stamp program 
were minimal.  American farmers, as well as the needy and 
businessmen, benefited from the Second World War. By late 
1939, even though the United States was not yet involved, 
the European war created jobs and the worst years of the 
Depression had passed. What was of potential significance 
for future food stamp legislation, however, was the New 
Deal interpretation of Section 32.  Section 32 did not 
purport to be welfare legislation.  Rather, the 1939 food 
stamp program emphasized the needs of the farmer, not 
those of the needy. 
S 
Following the end of the Korean War, the idea of 
1939 was revived.  At this time there were numerous 
proposals by Democrats in Congress to reestablish a food 
stamp plan which would again simultaneously eliminate 
food surpluses while helping the needy.  The Agricultural 
Act of 1956 (PL 84-540) directed the Secretary of 
Agriculture to study the feasibility of such an 
undertaking.  In a subsequent report to Congress in 
January, 1957, the Department of Agriculture recommended 
^ ■   "6 
*<- 
against it.  Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson 
j2,stima*ted that the cost involved in a food stamp plan 
wol»sL ae prohibitive.  Considering probable substitutions 
of non-food items by participants, he believed that food 
stamps would not be effective in disposing of 
agricultural surpluses.  Benson further maintained that a 
food stamp plan would not reduce price support 
expenditures for dairy and feed grains nor deal with 
seasonal or temporary surpluses as would a program of 
8 government purchase and direct distribution. 
One proponent of food stamp legislation, 
Representative Leonor Kretzer Sullivan (D. Mo.), 
responded most bitterly to the twenty-seven page 
Agriculture Report^  She said, "I am so sorry the 
Department of Agriculture has resisted so strongly, so 
continuously, so cruelly, the idea of channeling some of 
the mountain of surplus commodities to these really poor 
Americans.  True, there is in existence a surplus food 
distribution program but to characterize that program in 
9 
a word, I would say that it is wretched."  In June, 1957, 
and again in 1958, Sullivan sponsored legislation to 
o 
U.S., Department of Agriculture, An Analysis of 
Food Stamp Plans (January 1957). Cited in U.S., Congress, 
House, Establishment of a Food Stamp Plan, p. 24. 
q 
U.S., Congress, House, Food Stamp Act of 1977, H.R. 
7940, 95th Cong., 1st sess., 1977, p. 793. 
establish a food stamp plan, but failed to win enough 
10    ~ " 
support for passage each time. 
Then-, in 1959, Congress gave the Secretary of 
Agriculture an option to operate a two-year food stamp 
program using $250 million worth of food stamps each 
year.  The bill provided that the distribution of food be 
carried out "preferably through normal channels of trade" 
and to include any state that requested it.    During the 
waning months of the Eisenhower administration, however, 
the  Secretary chose not to exercise his authority in this 
12 
area. 
Shortly after his inauguration, President Kennedy 
sent a message to Congress in which he declared that the 
Department of Agriculture would set up a food stamp 
program for needy families in specific economically 
depressed areas.  Kennedy had favored food stamp 
legislation as a Senator in 1959 and as the newly-elected 
President he asserted, "It is my hope that this pilot 
program, while providing additional nutrition to those 
in need, will pave the way for substantial improvement in 
Georgianna Rathburn, ed., Congressional Quarterly 
Almanac 1964 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly 
Inc., 1965), p. 111. 
11T, ., Ibid. 
Ibid. 
oilr~pi e'se hlf" me"tlio'd"of'" "di"s1rriiDxct±Ttg— su rp 1 us - - food -*---- L ik e~ 
the 1939-1943 program, the Kennedy initiative received 
its authorization from Section 32 and its direction from 
14 the Department of Agriculture. 
On March 7, 1961, the Department of Agriculture 
revealed that eight areas had been selected for pilot 
programs:  Franklin County, Illinois; Floyd County, 
Kentucky; Virginia-Hibbing-Nashwauk Complex in Northern 
Minnesota; the Cit.y of Detroit, Michigan; Silver Bow 
County, Montana; San Miguel County, New Mexico; Fayette 
County, Pennsylvania; and McDowell County, West 
15 "* Virginia.    These communities were chosen because they 
were places of "chronic and widespread" unemployment. 
Most were mining areas which were experiencing mine 
17 
closures and the worst effects of the 1960 recession. 
U.S., President, Public Papers of the Presidents 
of the United States, John F. Kennedy (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 47. 
14 
"Transcript of the Kennedy News Conference on 
Domestic and Foreign Matters," The New York Tiimes, Feb. 
2, 1961, p. 6. 
U.S., Congress, House, Food Stamp Act of 1964, 
H.R. 1228 to accompany H.R. 10222, 88th Cong., 2nd sess., 
1964, p. 6. 
"Test of the President's Message to Congress 
Offering a Program for Agriculture," The New York' Times, 
March 17, 1961, p. 14. 
Ibid. 
Cooperation between state and local officials Tn tfie~~ 
selected areas was mandated in a Federal-State plan of 
operation and on May 29, 1961, the pilot program commenced 
in McDowell County, West Virginia.  By mid-July, 1961, the 
18 
other seven projects were also in effect. 
Specifically, the pilot food.stamp plan functioned 
in the following manner.  Participation by individual 
families was based solely on financial need.  Households 
entitled to any form of public assistance as well as 
other low-income families qualified for food stamps and 
were certified to participate in the program by state 
welfare agencies.  Once certified for participation, 
families bought food coupons at designated locations. The 
price of coupons equalled the amount a family normally 
spent for food out of its available income.  With the 
coupons it could purchase any food for human consumption 
except alcoholic beverages, tobacco, and specified 
imported foods in any retail store approved to accept 
food coupons. 
Retailers redeemed the coupons through the 
commercial banking system, depositing them in the bank 
just as other cash receipts and commercial paper.  The 
banks then redeemed the coupons through the Federal 
18 U.S., Congress, House, Food Stamp Act of 1964, p. 
10 
Reserve System.  To cover thfe cost of the program, the 
money collected from the participants' purchase of food 
coupons and the Department of Agriculture's transfer of 
sufficient Section 32 funds were maintained in a special 
19 
account in the U.S. Treasury. 
Mr. and Mrs. Alderson Muncy of Paynesville, West 
Virginia, became the first to benefit from the pilot food 
stamp project when they purchased $95.00 worth of food 
stamps for themselves and their 13 children.  The first 
people to buy food stamps since 1943, the Muncy family 
bought a can of pork and beansj as their first purchase at 
20 Henderson's Supermarket in Welch, West Virginia. 
Secretary of Agriculture Orville Freeman was present 
and told the crowd gathered in Welch that the program was 
a "pioneering effort" and a result of President Kennedy's 
"very deep concern that there should be anywhere in this 
great land of ours less than full use of our 
21 
abundance."    From this McDowell County project, he 
declared, "will come the know-how to reach other people 
22 
who are in need."    Freeman concluded that the ultimate 
19 Ibid., pp. 6-7. 
20 Tom Wicker, "First Food Given in Stamp Project," 
The New York Times, May 30, 1961, p. 1. 
21TU. , 
.Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
11 
aim was a "full nutritional diet" for everyone in the 
23 
nation. 
Public response to the program appeared to be one of 
satisfaction.  After the pilot program had been in 
operation for six months, a New York Times article stated 
that, "All concerned hope for its adoption on a permanent 
basis."   The article quoted one recipient, the mother of 
five, as she waited to purchase her stamps: "This is like 
having Christmas once a month.  The stamps help us out a 
lot.  We have better and more nourishing food for the 
kids.  If they ever try to take this Santa Claus away 
25 there will be a lot of squawking."    A Pennsylvania 
banker called the program "a tremendous success. The plan 
incorporates dignity, respect and humanitarianism. 
Persons on relief or who have low incomes no longer need 
be embarrassed by standing in lines to receive surplus 
food. The inherent dignity of man is sustained, elevating 
his morale and providing him with new confidence and 
2 fi 
self-respect."   An administrator in the Detroit 
Department of Welfare asserted, "The food stamp plan is 
23 JIbid. 
24 
"Food Stamp Project Stimulates Economy of 
Pennsylvania," The New York Times, Dec. 10, 1961, p. 78. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
12 
easier.by far to administer than the direct distribution 
of surplus commodities.  The people on low incomes are 
enthusiastic because they are eating better than ever 
27 before." 
The Department of Agriculture also conducted a 
survey to ascertain the reaction of several groups to the 
X pilot food stanip program.  Almost everyone interviewed 
preferred food stamps to the direct distribution program 
(although favorable and unfavorable opinions were given 
about both programs) and believed that the food stamp 
28 program should be continued.   A sampling of moderate and 
..^higher income families in two of the eight original pilot  "  fe- 
areas agreed that families without enough food should be     » 
29 helped.in the manner allowed by food stamps.    Most 
participating families indicated a preference for the 
food stamp program over the direct distribution of 
surplus foods because of the greater variety of foods 
30 
available through stamps.    Almost all of the retailers 
interviewed desired a continuation of the food stamp . , 
 \ 
27 Damon Stetson, "Detroit Applauds Food Stamp Plan," 
The New York Times, Dec. 10, p. 79. 
28 
811. 
U.S., Congress, House, Food Stamp Act of 1977, p. 
29 Ibid. 
30Ibid., p. 812. 
13 
—_3_1_ 
program.    Local-weIfare workers also believed that the 
food stamp program was a more successful way to raise 
food consumption among low income families than the 
32 direct distribution of commodities. 
The early success of the pilot program led to its 
growth.  In his 1962 budget message, President Kennedy 
requested funding for more areas.  By. August 1962 pilot 
programs existed in twenty-six regions, and after its 
first full year of operation a further extension of the 
A   33 program occurred. 
By May 15, 1964, pilot food stamp projects operated 
in 3 cities and forty counties in 22 states with 392,446 
participants.  Of the $6.5 million worth of food stamps 
issued during March 1964, $3.9 million represented stamps 
purchased with participants own income and the remaining 
$2.6 million represented the free or "bonus" stamps 
provided by the Department of Agriculture as the Federal 
Government's contribution.  Of each $100 worth of food 
stamps distributed, $61 worth or 61 percent was paid by 
participants in the program and the $39 worth or 39 
31 Ibid.  In addition, the program's actual operation 
caused them few problems. 
32 U.S., Congress, House, Food Stamp Act of 1977, 813. 
' 33 U.S., President, Public Papers' of the Presidents of 
the United States, John F. Kennedy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 30; U.S., Congress, 
House, Food Stamp Act of 1964, p. 7. 
14 
 *—__ , . . .. . , . . 24  
percent represented the Federal Government's expense. 
Program statistics indicated that food stamp 
participation followed a seasonal pattern.  Participation 
increased in the winter when unemployment increased and 
decreased in the late spring and summer when unemployment 
declined.  The level of participation was also responsive 
to internal changes within the 43 pilot areas which 
35 affected employment. 
The major criterion for evaluating the pilot program 
was its effectiveness in supplementing the diet of the 
poor.  Consequently, the program was measured largely by 
the extent to which it alleviated hunger.  Department of 
Agriculture studies declared the pilot program 
successful.  Food stamps.had both improved nutritional 
levels and increased food consumption.  In addition, the 
Department concluded that retail food store sales had 
increased and that very few persons had tried to take 
-advantage of the program.  The program was also deemed 
practical in terms of its administrative and operating 
4-  36 aspects. 
34 
"U.S. Food Surpluses & the Nation's Needy," 
Congressional Digest 43 (June/July 1964): 166. 
35 U.S., Congress, House, Food Stamp Act of 1964, p. 
7. 
Ibid., pp. 7-10. 
15 
11 is, apparept^J;.hat„„the^f_Qod., stamp^-progx-am—w&i-e-h—-—- 
started in 1961 differed dramatically from the one in 
1939.  Though both were based on the authority of Section 
32, the 1961 pilot projects were primarily and ostensibly 
a welfare measure to help the needy whereas the 1939 
program assisted the farmer. The 1939 food stamp plan was 
a type of price support action emanating from earlier 
Federal policies designed to improve farmers' real 
incomes and to stabilize prices.  As such it rightfully 
belonged under the auspices of the Department of 
Agriculture.  Aid to the needy and unemployed in the 
1939-43 program was, therefore, a spin-off benefit of the 
farm legislation. 
By the early 1960's, however, the situation had 
changed a great deal.  Fir-st of all, the country was not 
coming out of a severe depression which necessitated 
extensive government measures.  Secondly, overproduction 
did not pose a serious threat to the farmer because the 
Government maintained such policies as crop restriction 
and direct payments. The Federal ..Government, for example, 
bought the farmer's surplus commodities which facilitated 
the direct distribution of surplus commodities to the 
needy by the Department of Agriculture. 
What may be most significant was that the 1961 food 
stamp program did not contribute to the reduction of 
16 
agricultural surpluses.  In evaluating the earliest pilot 
projects the Department of Agriculture reported that the- 
first eight pilot projects were "too limited in scope to 
have any measurable effect upon farm income," but argued 
that the farmer had "a definite stake in any program 
37 
aimed at increasing the market for food." 
By 1964 the Department of Agriculture conceded that 
it had not yet determined the relative effects of the 
food stamp program (versus the direct distribution 
program) on farmers and on government.  Although it 
claimed that further research was necessary to better 
evaluate the impact of food stamps, the Department 
implied that the direct distribution of surpluses by the 
government was more effective in disposing of certain 
surpluses such as wheat, but that the food stamp program 
seemed to' be more effective in increasing total food 
consumption of low-income families.  While not regarding 
them as a substitute for welfare programs, the Department 
of Agriculture concluded that food stamps should be 
distributed in a manner that supplemented state and local 
38 
welfare programs. 
Obviously, the pilot program as an aid to farmers' 
37 U.S., Congress, House, Food Stamp Act of 1977, p. 
813. 
38Ibid, pp. 813-815. 
17 
appeared to be of secondary importance. -Most Americans 
viewed it, and rightly so, as a social rather than as an 
economic measure. Although people realized that it helped 
the economy, they nevertheless regarded the food stamp 
program as a welfare program, viewing food stamps as what 
they really are:  a form of income supplement. The 
public's widespread support evolved because of the 
egalitarian method of supplementing the needy's diet and 
the national spirit of helping less fortunate Americans. 
The prosperity of the early 1960's aided American 
tolerance and support of such a food relief plan. 
Thus, amid much public approval, President Johnson, 
in his agriculture message to Congress in early 1964, 
asked that the food stamp program be established on a 
permanent legislative basis.  As part of his 
administration's "War on Poverty," he repeated his 
39 
request in March. 
On August 31, 1964, Congress converted the 1961 
pilot program into a permanent food stamp program 
financed by the Federal Government, authorizing $375 
million in fiscal years 1965-1967 to cover program costs. 
39 
"President's Message to Congress Outlining His 
Program for Agriculture," The New York Times, Feb. 11, 
1964, p. 10; U.S., President, Public Papers of the 
Presidents of the United States, Lyndon B. Johnson 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1965), p. 379. 
18 
A3 enac-ted ,- the - permanent -food stamp program was i n.tended . 
to help low income families improve their diets.  It was 
designed to eventually replace the existing direct 
distribution program under which the Federal Government 
gave surplus foods to the states for distribution to the 
,40 ^ 
needy. 
In supporting the  food stamp program, Secretary of 
Agriculture Freeman referred to "inherent weaknesses" in 
41 the direct distribution method.    He mentioned the 
difficulty of furnishing a "varied, well-balanced diet" 
with only surplus commodities,*the formation of a 
separate distribution in competition with commercial food 
distribution, and "the problem of preventing violations'," 
a condition necessitating extensive administrative 
organization to remedy. 
The billys" original sponsor, Representative 
Sullivan, echoed Freeman's criticism of the direct 
distribution program.  "We have had this direct 
distribution program now for a number of years. . . . 
    ,i 
40 Rathburn, ed., Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 
1964, p. 110. 
41 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Agriculture, 
Food Stamp Plan, Hearings before the Committee on 
Agriculture on H.R. 5733, 88th Cong., 1st sess., 1963, p. 
13. 
Ibid. 
19 
People have to stand in line to receive this food"once aT~ 
month under all kinds of weather conditions, and so 
forth, and it has not been a very—maybe 'dignified' is 
not the word to use, but when you receive charity you 
43 
still have some dignity." 
Furthermore, involvement with the food stamp program 
disclosed that retail food store sales in the original 
eight projects grew eighyt percent and that the diets of 
 44 
the participating families " suB¥E'a>ft%-ira~nry—wsaproved. " 
Freeman estinhs-fee'a that most of the increased consumption 
by participants consisted of livestock products ar 
fruits and vegetables, foods not available under t 
45 direct distribution program. 
Under the regulations of the Food Stamp Act of 1964 
any community could elect to drop out of the direct 
distribution program and enter the food stamp' program 
instead.  The regulations of the permanent food stamp 
program were similar to those of the pilot projects. 
Needy families in participating communities could buy 
stamps worth a larger amount.  A family's cost for stamps 
43Ibid., p. 48. 
44 U.S., Congress, House, Food Stamp Act of 1964), p. 
8. 
45 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Agriculture, 
Food Stamp Plan,, p. 15; Rathburn, ed., Congressional 
Quarterly Almanac, 1964, p. 112. 
20 
*> 
depended on its size and economic status.  A low-'income  ~ 
family, for example, could purchase $6.00 worth of food 
stamps each week which whe-n ^redeemed would purchase 
$10.00 worth of food.46 
In addition to the Johnson Administration, the 
National Farmers Union, the National Grange, the AFL-CIO 
and the National Association of Counties supported the 
food stamp bill.  These groups argued that the direct 
distribution program was ineffective because it was 
limited to foods which were often not of a good 
nutritional balance and contended that the method of 
going to a central depot to get a sack of food was a 
humiliating dole.  A food stamp program, they argued, 
provided a more varied and nutritional diet by enabling 
the participant to obtain any domestic food, assisted 
farmers by disposing of agricultural products, and helped 
retailers by making participants contribute part of their 
47 
own income to acquire food stamps.    A statement by the 
National Farmers Union summed up well the feelings of 
these groups:  "Farmers have a stake in the rapid 
expansion of this program because of the strengthening of 
46 U.S., Congress, House, Food Stamp Act of 1964, p. 
8. 
47 Thomas N. Schroth, ed., Congress and the Nation 
1945-1964 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly 
Inc., 1965), p. 741. 
21 
markets for a broad range of food items, a number of 
which are in surplus supply." 
On the other hand, the Sullivan bill was opposed by 
the Chamber of Commerce of the United States and the 
American Farm Bureau Federation.  The Chamber of Commerce 
argued that the food stamp legislation was not basically 
agricultural legislation, but a measure "to promote 
49 
nutrition, health, and welfare."    Besides its belief 
that the Secretary of Agriculture had too much authority 
over the operation of the food stamp program, the Chamber 
of Commerce felt that "the bill would subsidize food 
50 
consumption beyond relief eligibility."    The 
organization argued that the food stamp plan was based on 
"the mistaken assumption that it is essentially lack of      /~X 
income that is the basic cause of inadequate nutrition 
and argued that "the increased consumption of food would 
be indeed slight and relatively insignificant in terms of 
total food consumption in the Nation." 
The American Farm Bureau Federation also did not 
believe that the program would make any significant 
48 U.S.Y Congress, House, Committee on Agriculture, 
Food Stamp Plan, p. 98. 
49Ibid, p.\^00. 
50Ibid., p. 101.. 
51Ibid., pp. 101-102. 
22 
contribution to increased food consumption of surplus 
foods.  It argued that the food distribution system was a 
52 
"much more sound procedure." 
The food stamp bill met little opposition in the 
Senate, but in the House a number of Southern Democrats 
and most of the Republicans opposed it.  The Republicans 
claimed the bill was primarily a welfare measure being 
53 
"charged to the farmer."   If food stamps were offered to 
all those who might demand them (possibly over two 
million people), the program would accrue costs of 
several billion dollars annually.  Furthermore, its 
effects on agricultural surpluses would be minimal since 
the program was not confined to surplus commodities.  The 
Republicans maintained, therefore, that it would be 
54 preferable to continue the direct distribution program. 
Most Northern Democrats, firm supporters of. food 
stamps, strongly favored the program as a superior method 
_C of assisting low-income families over the direct 
distribution of surplus commodities.  The Northern 
Democrats said that direct distribution offered a diet 
limited to food -in surplus, such as corn, rice, wheat, 
52 IbicU, pp. 104-105.  See Chapter I for a further 
discussion of the Farm Bureau's position. 
53 Rathburn, ed., Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 
1964, P. 112. 
Ibid. 
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dried milk, butter and cheese, but omitted fresh fruits, 
vegetables or milk.  Under the food stamp program, these 
55 foods could be bought.from a local grocer. 
In the end, House Democratic leaders attained 
passage of the food stamp legislation as part of a 
log-rolling deal between Northern and Southern Democrats. 
In exchange for Southern Democratic support of the food 
stamp bill, the Northern Democrats agreed to vote for the 
Southern-backed wheat-cotton bill. 
Commenting on its passage, the bill's sponsor, 
Representative Sullivan (D. Mo.), said that "President 
Johnson put the full weight of his office, and of his 
tremendous powers of persuasion, behind the legislation, 
and its final passage in the Congress today is largely a 
57 tribute to his powerful leadership."    She referred to 
the opposition by former Secretary of Agriculture Benson 
to similar legislation and added that current Secretary 
Freeman "has never wavered in his effective support of 
i- •   • j   ii 5 8 his idea." 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
57 U.S., Congress, House, Representative Sullivan 
speaking on administration cooperation of the Food Stamp 
Act of 1964, 88th Cong., 2nd sess., 11 Aug. 1964, 
Congressional Record 110: 18927. 
58Ibid. 
24 
OpposTBg^ the food stamp bill, ranking minority 
member of its committee, Representative Charles B. Hoeven 
(R. la.), commented that "this is a new and massive 
program which clearly shows the basic differences in 
Government philosophy between the Johnson Administration 
59 
and the mainstream of Republican thought."   He was also 
surprised that the Agriculture Secretary would "recommend 
a welfare program which is entirely charged to the 
Department of Agriculture ... If we are to have an 
expanded food stamp program, why is it not sponsored by 
60 the Department of Health, Education and Welfare?" 
Agriculture Secretary Freeman's response to this 
argument was that the Department of Agriculture should 
"be in a position to respond to the needs of the American 
agricultural programs that are intimately related to the 
welfare of American agriculture" and not "turn these 
programs over to other agencies who would administer them 
without any regard for the welfare of American 
agriculture."    In response to Hoeven1s belief that the 
program "would have practically no effect whatsoever on 
59 U.S., Congress, House, Representative Hoeven 
speaking against food stamps, 88th Cong., 2nd sess., 
Congressional Record 110: 18927. 
U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Agriculture, 
Food Stamp Plan, p. 20. 
Ibid. 
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-tiie—surpri-tis^s-Trf^Tffh'eatr^and conraiia"" other  surplus 
commodities,"   Freeman  maintained  that   food   stamps  would 
help  consumption  of   surplus  grains  because   it   increased 
the market for beef, chicken, turkeys and other animals 
62 that were fed with them. 
On signing the food stamp bill into law, President 
Johnson called it "a realistic and responsible step 
toward the fuller and wiser use of our agricultural 
abundance" and "one of our most valuable weapons for the 
war on poverty."    He believed that it "was the best of 
the humanitarian instincts of the American people wi'th 
64 the best of the free enterprise system." 
The enactment of the Food Stamp Act of 1964 
reflected the political significance of this welfare 
measure in Congress.  It demonstrated the strength of two 
groups, the farmers and the needy or welfare recipients. 
Politically, the interest of welfare recipients had not 
yet become more important than farm legislation as the 
log-rolling deal between Northern Democrats and Southern 
Democrats in the House attested.  Congressmen who 
6? 
Ibid., 1 p. 18; Rathburn, ed., Congressional 
Quarterly Almanac, 1964, p. 112. 
U.S., President, Public Papers of the Presidents 
of the United States, Lyndon B. Johnson (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 1025. 
Ibid. 
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represented farming interests still had the upper hand 
over northern and eastern urban congressmen who generally 
represented welfare interests.  Passage of the food stamp 
program hinged on support from farm state 
representatives.  Nevertheless, despite opposition from 
two groups as powerful as United States Chamber of 
~'v» ' 
Commerce and the American Farm Bureau Federation, the 
food stamp bill passed because representatives recognized 
the need to respond to the misfortunes of the poor in 
America. 
What may be more significant, however, was the fact 
that food stamps had been accorded enough interest in the 
early 1960's to allow both the Democratic administration 
and the Congress to endorse this form of food relief. 
Under two successive Republican administrations in the 
1950's a food stamp program generated little interest in 
Congress.  It was flatly opposed by Secretary of 
Agriculture Benson under the Eisenhower administration. 
Clearly, the passage of the permanent food stamp 
program pointed out the basic differences in philosophy 
Setween the Democratic and Republican parties. Consistent 
with Administration views, the Democratic party as a 
whole usually showed a greater enthusiasm for the.food 
stamp program than the Republicans, who often 
demonstrated apprehension, total disagreement, or limited 
27 
support of the food stamp program. Liberal support of the 
program was certainly not restricted to Democrats. 
See Chapter I for a further discussion of the 
political popularity of the food stamp program. 
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CHAPTER I 
The ideological and political conflict revealed in 
the debate over the passage of the Food Stamp Act of 1964 
continued as Congress renewed and amended the program in 
the next two decades.  The discovery of poverty 
intensified the debate and increased the concern that 
food programs did not successfully reach the truly needy. 
Hunger in America became a national issue and attracted 
increasing coverage in the public media. 
In April, 1967, the Senate Subcommittee on 
Employment, Manpower, and Poverty held hearings on food 
stamp program operations.  Committee members, including 
Robert F. Kennedy (D. N.Y. ) and Joseph Clark (D. Pa.-), 
traveled to Mississippi to probe accounts of problems in 
the change from the direct distribution program to the 
use of food stamps.  The Senators, toured homes in the 
small town of Cleveland, Mississippi and discovered 
families who suffered severe and debilitating hunger. The 
bleak existence of these families shocked them. After its 
return to Washington, the committee urged President 
Johnson to increase food stamp program participation 
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where.acute hunger existed and recommended reduced 
purchase requirements and free stamps for people with no 
incomes.  After several delays, "in late 1967, the 
Department of Agriculture finally lowered stamp prices in 
Mississippi and negotiated with state officials to 
guarantee Federal funding of households that could' not 
even afford the lowered purchase prices. 
The private sector also revealed its concern with 
hunger in 1967.  Formed in 1965, the Citizens' Crusade'' 
Against Poverty supported poverty legislation.  Backed by 
the United Auto Workers, the National Council of 
Churches, the United Presbyterian Church, and the Ford 
Foundation, the Citizens' Crusade aided black, 
Mexican-American, and white poverty groups to develop 
2 
their own leadership.   Richard W. Boone acted as 
executive director of the Citizens' Crusade.  In the 
summer of 1967, Boone formed a special antihunger lobby, 
/ 
the 25-member Citizens' Board of Inquiry into Hunger and 
Malnutrition in the United States, to examine Federal 
Maurice MacDonald, Food, Stamps, and Income 
Maintenance (Madison: Institute for Research on Poverty 
of the University of Wisconsin, 1977), pp. 8-9. 
2 
Nick Kotz, L^t Them Eat Promises; The Politics of 
Hunger in Ameft-ca-^CEnglewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 
1969), p. 11. 
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food relief. 
More significantly, the Senate Subcommittee hearings 
demonstrated increasing Congressional concern to provide 
adequate Federal food assistance to the needy. 
Previously, agriculture committees in both the House and 
Senate, dominated by southern and midwestern 
conservatives, protected commercial agriculture and 
opposed social welfare programs.  Although these 
committees represented a minority in Congress, they 
nevertheless controlled farm policy.  Therefore, liberal 
members of Congress in 1964 pushed through the permanent 
food stamp program by threatening not to vote for farm 
legislation that these conservatives supported.  For the 
next three years, expansions of the program depended on 
political trades to legislation which supported southern 
4 
cotton, peanuts, sugar cane or tobacco.   The agriculture 
committees shaped the final bills; liberal supporters of 
food stamps "seldom read the small print."   Rather, they 
bargained with Representative Sullivan (D. Mo.) who 
ignored the administrative drawbacks of the program and 
3 
Nick Kotz, Let Them Eat Promises: The Politics of 
Hunger in America (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 
1969), p. 11. 
4Ibid., pp. 47-48. 
Kotz, Promises, p. 48. 
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arranged the voting trades. 
By i967, however, many Congressmen joined in the 
"War on Poverty" and, though politically motivated, 
genuinely believed a system of food stamps could improve 
the lot of poor families.  Moving to the left of the 
Johnson administration, many of these Congressmen became 
7 identified with "the forgotten American.""  Termed "food 
aid reformers," these public figures used food stamps in 
their battle against the barriers that impeded reform in 
Q 
Federal food assistance. 
Amidst the debate on hunger, Congress renewed the 
food stamp program.  On September 27, 1967, Congress 
passed legislation which continued the program for two 
years and appropriated $200 million for fiscal 1968 and 
$225 million for fiscal 1969.  A hotly debated issue 
concerned the length of the new authorization.  The House 
desired a one-year while the Senate favored a three-year 
extension.  In the end,.Congress compromised with a two 
6Ibid. 
7  . 
Ibid., pp. 64 and 17. 
8 Ibid., pp. 18 and ff.  Among others,these "food and 
reformers" included Senators Clark and Kennedy as well as 
the other members of the Sub-committee on Employment, 
Manpower and Poverty and other interested members of 
Congress. 
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   "-.- ■-'■;- ~9-— —     "' "  " "  year continuation. 
A second controversy ensued over a proposal to exact 
a larger share of the program's costs from the states. 
The House rejected an Agriculture Committee amendment to 
require states to contribute 20 percent of the costs; 
existing law did not require states to make any 
contribution except for administrative expenses. 
Representative Sullivan 'contended that this amendment 
would compel many poor states to give up the program 
entirely.  She maintained the committee included the 
amendment in a desire to eliminate, rather than improve 
the program.    Responding to Sullivan's views, House 
Agriculture Committee Chairman W.R. Poage (D. Texas) 
asserted, "There is not a state in this Union that is so 
poor that it cannot pay 1 dollar out of 5 to feed these 
poor people." 
Page Belcher (R. Okla.), a ranking minority member 
of the House Agriculture Committee, opposed continuing 
9 
William B. Dickinson Jr., ed., Congress and the 
Nation Vol. I (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly 
Inc., 1969), p. 590. 
U.S., Congress, House, Rep. Sullivan speaking 
against the amendment, 90th Cong., 1st sess., 15 May 
1967, Congressional Record 113: 12625 and 8 June 1967, 
Congressional Record 113: 15148. 
U.S., Congress, House, Rep. Poage defending the 
amendment, 90th Cong., 1st sess., 8 June 1967, 
Congressional Record 113: 15151. 
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the food stamp program.  Belcher, along with eight other 
Committee Republicans and one Democrat feared the 
program's shift into a nationwide welfare activity. These 
men believed the program destroyed state and local 
initiative, failed to help agriculture, and did little to 
12 help the truly destitute. 
On the other side, liberal critics argued that the 
food stamp program did not provide adequate food 
assistance to needy Americans and questioned whether all, 
those truly entitled received aid through food stamps. 
They also questioned, whether the Government worked hard 
enough to increase the participation of the poor.  In 
addition, one of the most criticized aspects of the food 
stamp program pertained to the purchase requirement. This 
required needy families to pay "an amount equivalent to 
their normal expenditure for food" if they wished to 
13 
obtain food stamps.    Critics argued that the very poor 
have no "normal income much less a "normal" expenditure 
for groceries.  Thus, a low-income family with irregular 
income often found it difficult to save for the monthly, 
12 . Dickinson, ed., Congress and the Nation Vol. II, 
p. 590. 
13 Kotz, Promises, pp. 54-55 
34 
lump-sum payment for stamps. 
Thus, by 1967, participation averaged only 16 
percent of poor persons in areas where the program 
operated.  This low figure probably reflected a lack of 
information about food stamps, the inaccessibility of 
food stamp centers, racial discrimination, and the 
limited benefits of the program itself.  The stigma of 
poverty associated with the program also undoubtedly 
contributed to its low participation rate. 
Debate over Federal food assistance intensified in 
1968.  The Citizens' Board of Inquiry into Hunger and 
Malnutrition in the United States in their April 22, 
1968, report, Hunger U.S.A., based on nine months of 
study, strongly criticized all Government food programs. 
The ninety-six page report said that over 300 of the 
poorest counties in the United States offered no 
assistance of any kind and that between 10 and 14.5 
million Americans appeared seriously underfed. 
Specifically, the Board argued that the Government 
14 . Ibid., p. 55.  See also Elizabeth B. Drew, "Going 
Hungry in America," The Atlantic Monthly 222 (Dec. 1968); 
and William Chapman, "Food Stamps: Too Little for Too 
Few," The Progressive 39 (May 19 75). 
Kotz, Promises, p. 55. 
Citizens' Board of Inquiry into Hunger and 
Malnutrition in the United States, Hunger U.S.A. (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1968), pp. 50-53 and ff. 
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set food stamp prices at prohibitively high levels while 
food stamp bonuses remained too low to provide an 
adequate diet.  Tl^e government treated families with no 
income as nonexistent and built discrepancies into both 
the schedule of prices for stamps and the sizes of 
bonuses.  According to the report, lump-sum payments, 
continued review of eligibility, and gaps between the 
termination of the direct distribution program and the 
start of the food stamp program caused "substantial 
17 individual suffering." 
The Board urged that free food stamps be provided to 
families with no income or available cash.  Payment, when 
required, should be low enough to "promote rather than 
18 discourage participation."   Prices should be adjusted 
for seasonal fluctuations in income.  The Board al-eo felt 
19 that eligibility procedures should be streamlined. 
As a rebuttal to the Board's report, the House 
Agriculture Committee, chaired by W.R. Poage (D. Texas), 
issued a "Hunger Study."  It contained statements by 
county officials which the comjnittee said, "led to the 
unmistakable conclusion that there is very little actual 
Ibid., p. 66. 
18 Ibid., pp. 66-67. 
Ibid. 
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hunger- i-n—the-Uni feed States >- butwidespread malnutrition 
caused largely by ignorance as to what constitutes a 
20 balanced diet."    Poage concluded that "the (Board's) 
report was quite inaccurate and misleading to put it 
mildly.  There seems to be little or no evidence that any 
substantial hunger exists as the result of refusal of 
assistance agencies, public and private, to give needed 
21 
aid to those who are unable to work." 
An intelligence unit of the Department of Defense, 
the Institute for Defense Analysis, attacked the 
credibility of the Board's report in "Note N506, Hunger 
U.S.A.—A Critical Review."  It accused the writers of 
Hunger U.S.A. of ignorance of nutrition and maintained 
that Federal food assistance remained beneficial.  The 
Institute implied that ignorance caused hunger and 
22 
malnutrition in the United States. 
However, on the contrary, in a May 21, 1968, CBS TV 
documentary, "Hunger in America," the degree of hunger 
and suffering appeared even more severe than that 
20 Dickinson, ed., Congress and the Nation Vol. II, 
p. 592. 
21 Ibid.  Poage's words most likely reflected his own 
feelings about the poor—Although he supported liberal 
benefits for farmers, Poage was considered a conservative 
in social welfare legislation. 
22 Kotz, Promises, pp. 112-114. 
37 
23 depicted in Hunger U.S.A.    The hour-long program 
assented that 10 million Americans suffered severe 
hunger.  It chronicled residents in four areas of the 
United States:  Mexican-Americans in San Antonio, Texas; 
Navajo Indians in Arizona; blacks in Hale County, 
Alabama; and white tenant farmers in Loundon County, 
Virginia.  The documentary juxtaposed poor children's 
unhealthy pallor with the plush wealth that surrounded 
these unfortunate pockets of poverty.  The graphic 
relevation of the physical and mental effects of 
malnutrition on children and the premature aging of 
impoverished adults presented to viewers a vivid and 
24 powerful denunciation of public policy. 
It, too, criticized Federal attempts to provide food 
relief to the poor.  Charging the Department of 
Agriculture with reluctant use of emergency powers, the 
show suggested that the Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare might handle food relief more adequately. 
Specifically, the documentary criticized the operation of 
the food stamp program.  It claimed that the lump-sum 
23 U.S., Congress, House, Rep. Bray speaking on 
"Hunger in America," 90th Cong., 2nd sess., 30 July 1968, 
Congressional Record 114: 24237. 
24 CBS TV, Transcript, CBS Reports "Hunger in 
America," May 21, 1968. 
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payment needed to acquire stamps deterred participation. 
For many of the poor the accumulation of any sum of money 
proved difficult; what little money one obtained went 
immediately to pay a bill.or to feed an urgently hungry 
child.  In many cases family income simply stood far too 
25 low to afford stamps. 
In response to the ensuing clamor, the House 
Committee on Education and Labor asked the Secretary of 
Agriculture for a report.  In a May 27, 1968 letter to 
Chairman Carl Perkins (D. Ky.) Secretary Freeman 
responded.  He called "Hunger in America" "a biased, 
one-sided, dishonest presentation of a serious national 
26 problem."    He referred to its "gross errors of facts" 
and maintained that other facts "were completely 
27 ignored."   Freeman said, "Individual cases were 
presented in such a manner as to convince an average 
viewer that they represented the norm for food aid 
recipients throughout the United States, which they did 
28 
not."   He called a "lie" the producers' charge that the 
Ibid. 
26 U.S., Congress, House, Sec. of AgricultureFreeman 
discussing hunger in the U.S. in reference to the CBS 
documentary "Hunger in America" in a letter to Chairman 
Perkins, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., 3 June 1968, 
Congressional Record 114: 15819. 
27 Ibid. 
Ibid. 
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Department of Agriculture "protects farmers, not 
29 
consumers, and especially not destitute consumers." 
According to Freeman, in the past seven and a half years, 
the Department of Agriculture distributed 7.9 billion 
pounds of food at a cost of $1,320,560,000 and $279.7 
.30 
million worth of bonus food stamps to needy families. 
On May 27, 1968, Secretary Freeman formally 
requested equal time on the CBS network to refute the 
presentation of hunger provided by the May 21 
documentary.   The network did not grant his request. CBS 
president, Dr. Frank Stanton, defended the broadcast as 
"a hard-hitting job of investigatory reporting" about "a 
^ 32 
critical and shameful problem."   He added that the 
"issue of hunger transcends the superficial issue of 
33 
assessing blame for its continued existence."    "The 
purpose of the broadcast," Stanton concluded, "was to 
report to the people the fact that hunger is a problem in 
29.,.,.-. Ibid. 
30Ibid. 
Ben A. Franklin, "Freeman Asks Equal Time to Rebut 
CBS Film," The New York Times, May 28, 1968, p. 26. 
32 
"CBS Rebuffs Freeman on Broadcast," The New York 
Times, May 30, 1968, p. 50. 
33 JJIbid. 
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America, not that most Americans are well fed." 
Representative William Bray (R. Ind. ) believe~d both 
Hunger U.S.A. and "Hunger in America" presented 
misleading depictions: 
Both reports seem to have been 
made with more of an eye for sensa- 
tionalism than for presenting the truth 
of the matter; both left the clear 
implication that no one took notice of 
hunger and malnutrition and nothing was 
being done. 
Ignored was the fact that close to 
36 million Americans, at an annual cost 
of over §900 million, take part in the 
entire Federal food program.  12.5 million 
children get free lunches at school; 6.5 
million children get free milk during the 
school day; 6 million people get surplus , 
food or participate in the food stamp 
plan; 1.3 millipn people receive food 
donated tcOefeaTitable institutions; 
160,000 children in low-income areas get 
free meals in a new breakfast program. 
More than anything else, CBS's documentary on hunger 
intensified the issue of hungry Americans and equitable 
food assistance.  The concern over food relief, however, 
underscored the general problems of welfare recipients. 
Middle-Class Americans often overlook the culture of 
poverty.  The poor commonly feel powerless, incompetent, /* 
and dependent on others.  "A welfare system in which the 
Ibid. 
35 U.S., Congress, House, Rep. Bray speaking on the 
role of government in aiding the hungry, 90th Cong., 2nd 
sess., 30 July 1968, Congressional Record 114: 24237. 
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dole is grudgingly given and regimentally supervised" 
intensifies these feelings."    Even the use of food 
stamps can be humiliating. When the participant purchases 
food at the grocery store, for example, Federal law 
mandates that he g^ve his food stamp booklet to the 
cashier, who then pulls out the necessary number of 
stamps.  Critics contend that the poor suffer yet another 
indignity by not being trusted to remove their own 
37 
stamps. 
In response to the increasing concern over Federal 
food assistance programs, the Senate adopted a resolution 
on July 30, 1968, to establish a thirteen-member Select 
Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs.  The Senate 
created this committee, composed of members of the 
Committees on Labor and Public Welfare and on Agriculture 
and Forestry, to examine the extent of hunger in the 
United States.  In preparation for adopting the 
resolution, the Senate Subcommittee on Employment, 
Manpower, and Poverty held hearings in May, 1968.  The 
Reverend Ralph Abernathy, president of the Southern 
Christian Leadership Conference and head of the Poor 
People's Campaign, testified May 29.  He said the poor 
36 
Kotz, Promises, p. 242. 
37,..,, Ibid. 
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traveled to Washington "to say that hunger in America 
must be abolished and we cannot compromise on that 
38 fact."   Abernathy's demands, among others, included free 
food stamps to families with no income or insufficient 
cash to buy stamps.  Abernathy preferred the food stamp 
program to the direct distribution program because the 
latter"s "emphasis on starch increases the incidence of 
so much malnutrition, illness, infant mortality and so 
39 forth, among the poor." 
The creation of the Senate Select Committee on 
Nutrition and Human Needs formally recognized that the 
food stamp program existed first as a welfare measure and 
secondly as Agriculture legislation. As its name implied, 
the Select Committee concerned itself with the social 
needs of America, not its economic needs.  Thus, the 
formation of this committee supported the claims of early 
opponents of the food stamp program, like Republican 
Representative Hoeven, who called the initiative a 
welfare program under Agriculture control.  Because food 
stamps function as an income supplement, the program 
.increased the total resources available to a needy 
38 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and 
Public Welfare, Hunger and Malnutrition in the United 
States, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Employment, 
Manpower, and Poverty on adopting S Res 281, 1968, p. 68 
39Ibid, pp. 68-71. 
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family, regardless of its effects on agriculture.40 
Opponents of food stamps therefore argued that benefits 
accrued to the agriculture industry would be minimal, not 
only because foods purchased with food stamps often did 
not reduce agriculture's efforts focused on the food 
stamp program.  Administration of the program prevented 
the Department from upgrading farm policy:  funding for 
the latter came from the same budget as funding for food 
stamps. 
Politically, the creation of the Senate Select 
Committee on Nutrition and Human needs indicated that 
social measures gleaned more popularity and influence 
than farm legislation.  Welfare measures increasingly 
replaced economic supports to the farmers as the idealism 
of new, liberal Congressmen challenged the conservatism 
of older, farm-state Congressional leaders.  The early 
efforts of Senators, Kennedy, Clark, Mondale, McGovern, 
and Javits andyCongressmen Foley, Goodell, and Quie 
eventually included most liberal-to-moderate members of 
both political parties.  These men tried to counter the 
resistance of Congressional conservatives, like Poage and 
41 Whitten, to the food stamp program. 
40 MacDonald, p. 89. 
41 Kotz, Promises, p. 191. 
44 
In sum, by 1968, hunger was clearly a public issue. 
The findings of groups like the Citizens' Crusade Against 
42 Poverty and the Field Foundation  pointed out to 
Americans that hunger and starvation existed in this 
country, not only in distant, faraway lands.  Most 
important, the all powerful medium of television brought 
the image of hungry Americans into millions of 
middle-class living rooms.  Critical of all Federal food 
programs, CBS's "Hunger in America" elicited much 
reaction from both the public and private sectors in the 
United States.  Regardless of its accuracy, it succeeded 
in creating an awareness' that problems existed in the 
food stamp program. 
In late September, 1968, Congress extended the Food 
Stamp Act of 1964 through December 31, 1970, and 
authorized appropriations from $225 to $315 million and 
appropriated $340 million for fiscal 1970 and $170 
million for the first half of fiscal 1971.  It also 
directed the Secretary of Agriculture to submit an annual 
43 
report on the program's operation.    Although this 
4 2 In May, 1967, a group of doctors sponsored by the 
Field founation went to the Mississippi Delta to examine 
the condition of the children there.  They took their 
findings to Senators Kennedy and Clark in mid-June 1967. 
43 Dickinson, ed., Congress and the Nation Vol. II, 
p. 594. 
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"A 
legislation occurred too soon after the establishment of 
the Senate Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs 
to reflect any qf their findings on hunger and professed 
no major changes in the operation of the program, it 
reinforced a consensus in Congress that the food stamp 
program remained a viable method of food assistance. 
Administration backing of the program, however, became 
uncertain. 
In the later years of his administration, President 
Johnson failed to lend much support to Federal food 
assistance, including food stamps. In 1968, Johnson faced 
fiscal difficulties because of the Vietnam War. He wanted 
Congress to increase taxes to raise funds for the war and 
needed the support of conservatives.  He did not want to 
endanger his tax bill by supporting more food assistance. 
A major Congressional overhaul of the food stamp program 
44 
appeared doubtful without full Presidential support. 
In May, 1969, however, newly-elected President Nixon 
requested funds to reform the food stamp program. 
Publicly acknowledging that millions of poor Americans 
endured hunger and malnutrition, Nixon called for a plan 
to provide the poor with enough food stamps for a decent 
44 Bette K. Fishbem, The Food Stamp Program (White 
Plains: The Institute for Socioecjpnomic Studies, 1977), 
p. 6. 
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diet and to bring the cost of stamps to an affordable 
i   i 45 level. 
Throughout 1969, the Senate Select Committee on 
Nutrition and Human Needs hearings focused on the' 
difficulties that the poor faced when they applied for 
and received food under Federal programs.  Witnesses 
complained of administrative red tape when they applied 
for stamps and objected that they had to travel miles to 
pick them up.  Chairman George S. McGovern (D. S.D.) led 
the reform of the food stamp program in the Senate which 
earned him national reputation. 
Additionally, in the summer and fall of 1969, House 
Agriculture Committee hearings revealed that the existing 
system of food stamps proved insufficient to reach enough 
poor Americans. Testimony from representatives from local 
and national farm organizations, welfare interest groups, 
45 U.S., President, Public Papers of the Presidents 
of the United States, Richard M. Nixon (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), pp. 350-352,  In 
his "Special Message to the Congress Recommending a 
Program to End Hunger In America" on May 6, 1969, Nixon 
conceded that "precise factual description of its 
Malnutrition' s~J   extent" was not available at that time. 
46 Robert A. Diamond, ed., Congress and the Nation 
Vol. Ill (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 
1974), p. 628; Kotz, Promises, p. 202. See U.S'. Congress, 
Senate, Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs, 
Welfare Reform and Food Stamps, Hearings before the 
Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs of the 
United States Senate, 1969. 
47 
food stamp bills.  New options for farm policies also 
transpired in these hearings. 
Clearly, by 1969 hunger emerged a stronger political 
issue than ever before.  A change in administrations 
played an important role.  A Republican presided in the 
White House, but the Democrats still maintained a 
majority in Congress.  Since 1961, under two successive 
Democratic administrations, Democrats in Congress 
explored the ramifications of new, liberal Government 
programs such as food stamps. Although Democrats Kennedy, 
Clark, and McGovern, for example, did not closely 
associate with president Johnson, they often avoided 
criticizing a Democratic President. Under Nixon, partisan 
politics heightened as Democrats attacked Republican 
attempts at food stamp reform. 
President Nixon's backing of improved Federal food 
assistance surprised many Democrats and liberal 
supporters of the food stamp program.  Since Nixon 
referred only once in his campaign to the possibility 
47 See U.S., Congress, House, Committee on 
Agriculture, General Farm Program and Food Stamp Program, 
Hearings before the Committee on Agriculture ^art 1, 
1969; and U.S., Congress, House, Committee on 
Agriculture, General Farm Program and Food Stamp Program, 
Hearings before the Committee on Agriculture Part 2, 
1969. 
48 Kotz, Promises, p. 191. 
48 
that many Americans might be hungry, the "food aid 
reformers" incorrectly predicted that as President, Nixon 
would not support increased Government food relief. Nixon 
recognized early in his administration, however, that 
hunger endured as a popular, albeit volatile, issue and 
thus tried to use it to all possible advantage. 
Unencumbered by years of old commitments to southern 
Democrats who dominated agriculture, the President and 
his cabinet could tajce a fresh look at food relief 
programs.  Inevitably, the Democrats criticized the 
49 President's efforts at food stamp reform. 
Indeed, the food stamp program acted as a powerful 
political weapon.  In one attempt to deliver relief to 
several counties in South Carolina which faced acute 
hunger, the administration developed an emergency food 
stamp plan.  Senator McGovern quickly denounced the plan 
as unsatisfactory because it did not reach enough hungry 
families.  At the same time, others believed Secretary of 
Agriculture Clifford Hardin would be ruined politically 
if he did not effect acceptable improvements in the food 
stamp program.  The agribusiness establishment urged him 
to enlarge food assistance programs and to resist efforts 
to take the food stamp program away from the Agriculture 
49Ibid., pp. 194-195 
49 
Department jurisdiction. Most farm groups recognized that 
Congressional backing for farm policy was weak as urban 
Congressmen disapproved of large subsidy payments to 
wealthy farmers from the same budgets as food 
assistance.    Farm lobbyists and farm-state 
representatives agreed to approve food assistance 
expansion to prevent the loss of their political control; 
if the food stamp program moved to the Department of 
health, Education, and Welfare their bargaining power 
would disappear.  Rather, they desired that food 
assistance programs remain under the auspices of the 
Department of Agriculture in order to barter in Congress 
for continued farm price supports.    W.R. Poage (D. 
Texas), House Agriculture Committee Chairman, told the 
liberals in Congress that "more food to the poor" 
50 Ibid., p. 206. 
Ibid. , p. 207; U.S., Congress, House, Committee on 
Agriculture, General Farm program and Food Stamp Program, 
hearings before the Committee on Agriculture, Part 1, pp. 
205 and ff.  Only the American Farm Bureau, the exception 
in the farm bloc, wished to eliminate the farm price 
support program.  Because the Farm Bureau realized farm 
policies gained votes by trading with liberals for food 
stamp expansion, it desired that food stamps be 
transferred to the Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare where agriculture committees would not control 
the voting.  Indeed, in the House Agriculture Committee 
hearings in August, 1969, Farm Bureau President Charles 
B. Shuman, after recommending several proposals to aid 
commercial agriculture, noted that urban America was at 
odds with existing farm programs. 
50 
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-jdep.andsd__on J^continued subsidies to the farmer." 
Admittedly, Congress tied food assistance reform and farm 
policy together to pass food stamp legislation in 1964 as 
well as in 1967 and 1968.  While the liberals had 
threatened not to vote for the farm legislation if the 
food stamp legislation failed to pass, the farm lobbyists 
and their Congressional supporters now retained their 
53 
subsidies by threatening food stamp legislation. 
Pressure for changes in the food stamp program 
during 1969 came also from the National Council on Hunger 
and Malnutrition.  Led by nutritionist Jean Mayer, this 
organization lobbyied in Congress, developed local 
support in communities across the nation, and filed suits 
in behalf of the poor. Acting With the Columbia Center on 
Social Welfare, the National Council "attempted court 
action" to compel the Department of Agriculture to 
54 
allocate more funds to food assistance.    In late 
October, 1969, John R. Kramer, executive director of the 
National Council, charged that Congress used the food 
55 
stamp hearings to "vent . . . disrespect for the poor." 
52 Kotz, Promises, p. 207. 
Ibid. 
54Ibid., pp. 216-217. 
55 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Agriculture, 
General Farm Program and Food Stamp Program, Hearings 
before the Committee ori'"*'Agriculture, Part 2, p. 735. 
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He accused Representative Poage of being "willing to 
sweeten a program of guaranteed annual income for 
well-to-do farmers with a dollop of food stamps for the 
poor to make sure the House is willing to swallow the 
entire portion." 
Although no major changes occurred in the program's 
operation in 1969, Congress finally.cleared a bill on 
November 6, that increased appropriations for fiscal 1970 
from $340 to $610 million as President Nixon requested in 
57 May.   In 1970, however, Congress enlarged the food stamp 
program and extended it for three years.  This amendment 
to the Food Stamp Act of 1964 imposed important 
administrative changes and increased benefits. 
Up until this time, the states determined their own 
eligibility standards.  The major provision of the bill 
formulated in 1970 established uniform, national 
participation standards with household income and other 
financial resources the basic criterion of eligibility. 
The bill also provided free stamps for families with 
monthly income under $30 and contained a work requirement 
under which adults would become ineligible for food 
stamps and lose benefits for their entire family if they 
Ibid., p. 736. 
57 U.S., President, Public Papers of the Presidents 
of the United States, Richard M. Nixon, p. 352. 
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/refused employment on jobs that paid at least the minimum 
wage.  It also established the value of the food stamp 
58 
allotment to reflect increases in the cost of living. 
In addition, the bill permitted public assistance 
recipients to certify for the food stamp program by means 
of an affidavit and allowed participants sixty years or 
older to use stamps to purchase meals delivered to them 
59 by a nonprofit organization or local government.    The 
bill,- signed into law January 11, 1971, also authorized 
appropriations:  $1,750,000,000 for fiscal 1971 and 
open-ended authorizations for 1972 and 1973. 
After greatly reducing food stamp prices and 
increasing stamp allotments in early 1971, Congress 
further expanded the food stamp program in 1973 and 1974. 
In 1973, Congress extended the program to all counties in 
the United States and directed the states to complete the 
transfer from food distribution to food stamps. 
Legislation in 1974 increased Federal subsidies for costs 
incurred by the states in the administration of the 
program.  Up until this time, the Federal Government 
58 Public Law 91-671, Statutes at Large 84, Sec. 3, 
2049. 
59 This would include programs such as "Meals on 
Wheels." 
Public Law 91-671, Statutes at Large 84, Sec. 7, 
2052. 
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reimbursed the states for 62.5 percent of costs for 
certificaion of non-public assistance households, fair 
hearings, and outreach activities.  Under the 1974 
legislation states received 50 percent of all costs 
incurred in administering food stamps. 
The 1971, 1973, and 1974 amendments demonstrated the 
strong support given to the food stamp program.  These 
^fcrhree amendments in particular, however, produced 
"Significant increases in the program in both household 
and area participation as well as in program costs.  In 
addition, because of increased unemployment and inflated 
food prices during the 1974-1975 recession, participation 
grew dramatically.  The increased enrollments subjected 
program operations to public scrutiny. What that scrutiny 
revealed alarmed many taxpayers and their 
representatives.  As the size of the program increased so 
did complaints about abuse and mismanagement.  Congress 
listened to countless tales.of food stamp thefts, fraud 
by case workers, counterfeiting of stamps, and lying by 
participants about income and household size. Accounts of 
participants driving up to pick up their stamps in 
expensive cars or middle-class college students getting 
food stamps particularly infuriated many taxpayers and 
Clarkson, pp. 16-19; MacDonald, pp. 10-17, 
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members of Congress. 
In spite of mounting criticisms, solutions to the 
problems that plagued food stamps were not immediate nor 
easy.  The initial high regard for the food stamp program 
caused one of the biggest barriers to reform. Food stamps 
had been accorded political popularity.  It proved 
difficult to reconcile the fact that a program once 
regarded as practical to administer and operate now 
served as a source of contention. 
More important, partisan politics continued to 
plague the food stamp program.  Though the Congress still 
held a Democratic majority as it did when it expanded the 
program under the Nixon administration, many Senators and 
Congressmen blamed the economic policies of two 
successive Republican administrations for the increased 
use and subsequent abuse of the program.  Republican 
economic policies, they contended, could not help but 
cause families to turn to food stamps for mere economic 
sustenance. Clearly, the basic differences in liberal and 
Republican thought characterized the food stamp program. 
"Food Stamp Furor," Newsweek, October 20, 1975, 
pp. 35-36 
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CHAPTER II 
In late 1974, in an effort to cut fiscal 1975 
spending, President Ford proposed that low-income 
families pay more towards the cost of food stamps.  His 
proposal, estimated to save the Federal Government $215 
million in fiscal 1975 and nearly $650 million each year 
after that, required 95 percent of participants to pay 30 
t 
percent of their monthly income on food stamps. .Under the 
existing system, the amount paid by recipients, based on 
family size and income, varied on a sliding scale; the 
average family paid 23 percent of its monthly income on 
stamps.   Under Ford's proposal, even though the cost of 
food stamps would have increased, the monthly dollar 
2 
value of stamps would have remained the same. 
Congressmen understandably denounced the 
administration's proposal. The Washington-based Consumers 
Union, and the Food Research and Action Center of New 
See Appendix, Table 1. 
2 
Carolyn Mathiasen, ed., Congressional Quarterly 
Almanac, 1975 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 
Inc., 1976), p. 679. 
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3 
York" brought court "action against the increase.   The 
Department of Agriculture received 1,000 critical letters 
and delayed a final decision to initiate the proposal. 
Nevertheless, on January 17, 1975, the Department 
4 
announced final approval of the price increase.. 
Critics of the new regulations believed that 
increased costs to the poor appeared unjust. On the other 
hand, the administration called the proposal fair and 
maintained the Government could not afford the soaring 
cost of the program ($4 billion in fiscal 1975) amid huge 
budget deficits.  Clearly, the proposal reflected Ford's 
5 
conservative philosophy. 
Legislation to check the price increase gained 
widespread support from both Republicans and Democrats 
and quickly passed through Congress.  The legislation, 
which passed February 5, imposed no changes in the 
program except to freeze the cost of food stamps at 
January 1, 1975 levels and to prevent the new Agriculture 
3 
Martha Grotten, ed., Congress and the Nation Vol. 
IV (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 
1977), p. 421. 
4 
"U.S. Agency Cuts Food Stamp Aid," The New York 
Times, Jan. 18, 1975, p. 15. Since the proposal was to be 
put into effect through changes in departmental 
regulations it did not require Congressional approval. 
5 
U.S., President, Public Papers of the Presidents of 
the United States, Gerald R. Ford (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 666-668. 
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Department regulations from taking effect./ Because the 
bill (HR 1589) passed by overwhelming margins in both the 
House and Senate, the President's veto /Would have been 
ineffective. 
This nearly unanimous agreement/ in Congress, 
however, proved deceptive; opponents of food stamps still 
criticized the program's administration as well as the 
loopholes which allowed the nor/-needy to participate. The 
promises of changes by the 19/75 session of Congress 
permitted many of these crLfcics to vote for HR 1589" as an 
emergency measure.  Although they still remained unhappy 
with the operation of the program, many in Congress 
believed forthcoming legislation by the House and Senate 
agriculture committees would rectify some of the problems 
7  / 
of food stamps. 
/ 
In early 19/75, also, the recession affected 
enrollment in the food stamp program.  Participation rose 
to a high of, 19.6 million people in April, 1975 amid 
rumors that middle-class Americans bought food stamps and 
The vote was 378 to 38 in the house and 76 to 8 in 
the Senate.  At .the same time, the Senate passed a 
separate resolution instructing the Secretary of 
Agriculture to study the food stamp program and to submit 
legislative recommendations. 
7 
Jodie Allen, "Reforming the Food Stamp Program," 
The Washington Post, Feb. 1, 1975. 
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that the Department of Agriculture made large 
overpayments.  As a result, several bills emerged in 
Congress to tighten food stamp eligibility requirements, 
though none passed. 
Political debate over the food stamp program 
intensified in August, 1975.  One dispute dealt with the 
July, 1975 Department of Agriculture Food Stamp Report. A 
second incident related to a speech that Secretary of the 
Treasury William E. Simon gave at a Junior Achievement 
meeting. 
On August 6, 1975, Senator George S. McGovern (D. 
S.D.), Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on 
9 
Nutrition and Human Needs,  released sections of the USDA 
Food Stamp Report which had been suppressed by the Office 
of Management and Budget.  McGovern charged that these 
sections refuted contentions that the food stamp program 
seemed unmanageable.  He charged that the Ford 
o 
U.S., Congress, Senate, Select Committee on 
Nutrition and Human Needs, Options for Reforming the Food 
Stamp Program, Hearings before the Select Committee on 
Nutrition and Human Needs, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975, 
p. 26 . 
9 
At this time, the members of the Senate select 
Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs were George 
McGovern (D. S.D.), Chairman, Herman E. Talmadge (D. 
Ga.), Philip A. Hart (D. Mich.), Walter F. Mondale (D. 
Minn.), Edward M. Kennedy (D. Mass.), Gaylord.-Nelson (D. 
Wis.), Alan Cranston (D. Cal.), Hubert Humphrey (D. 
Minn.), Charles H. Percy (R. 111.), Robert Dole (R. 
Kans.), Henry Bellman (R. Okla.), Richard S. Schweiker 
(R. Pa.), and Mark D. Hatfield (R. Ore.). 
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administration did "not want the truth to be told about 
food stamps"~arid^ thaF~it had ~^r"e"cycl^^ drscrgdit^a" Nixcfn 
tactics."   McGovern asserted that, contrary to 
administration claims, the Agriculture Department report 
indicated the probable decline of both the cost of the 
program ffnd the number of participants by 1980.  He said 
those who knew the contents of the suppressed section 
continued to "mislead and deceive." 
McGovern's remarks elicited much response.  The 
Atlanta Constitution reported that Assistant Secretary of 
Agriculture Richard L. Feltner, whose staff drew up the 
report, said that "nothing^ was deliberately suppressed" 
12 from the public version of -the study released in July. 
The newspaper also reported that a spokesman for the USDA 
disclosed that no information existed in the published 
report which predicted the number of people eligible for 
13 food stamps in the year ahead.    This disclosure refutec 
McGovern's assertion about participation.  The New York 
U.S., Congress, Senate, Senator McGovern's 
statement on releasing suppressed chapters, S. Res. 58, 
94th Cong., 1st sess., 10 Sept. 1975, Congressional 
Record 121: 28411. 
Ibid. 
12 Beau Cutts, "Stamps Data Held Biased," The Atlanta 
Constitution, August 7, 1975. 
Ibid. 
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Times reported that administrators in the Department of 
Agriculture did not return telephone calls to respond to 
questions that the released material raised.  The paper 
reported that Whitney Shoemaker, a spokesman for The 
Budget Office, verified that the agency had authorized 
the Department of Agriculture to emend the report before 
it reached Congress.  He said that the budget agency "had 
challenged some material in the Agriculture draft report, 
suggesting they were made on questionable economic 
14 
assumptions and some other parts were not germane." 
While addressing the 32nd annual conference of 
Junior Achievers in Bloomington, Indiana, on August 12, 
1975, Secretary of the Treasury William E. Simon spoke of 
the explosion of government spending.  He asserted that 
the Federal Government has taken responsibility for 
problems that people should solve themselves. He referred 
to the "best of intentions" that "wind up with social 
problems that are spinning out of control."    He 
considered the food stamp program: 
The food stamp program began as a small, 
$14 million experiment in 1962.  By 1976, 
it will cost over $6.6 billion a year—a 
14 Nancy Hicks, "Food Stamps Data Held Suppressed," 
The New York Times, August 7, 1975, p. 34. 
U.S., Congress, Senate, Select Committee on 
Nutrition and Human Needs, The Food Stamp Controversy of 
1975, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975, p. 36. 
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47,000 percent-- lircrea^e-^aiid' It-is ^ar-w&li—-   
known haven for the chiselers and rip-off 
artists.  Only a few weeks ago, a national 
magazine advertised a booklet that told 
people how to obtain food stamps even if 
they earned as much as $16,000 a year.. So 
much for the spirit of self-reliance. 
Simon's remarks reflected the administration's position 
and became the target for angry response from food stamp 
supporters. 
Harriet Van Home, in an article in The New York 
Post, August 13, 1975, criticized Simon and strongly 
supported the food stamp program as a viable means of 
feeding the needy. She charged that every time Simon made 
a speech he offended several million Americans and that 
17 his "contempt for non-productive Americans goes deep." 
She asserted that by Simon's "credo, the needy can be 
forgotten" and that in his "tirade against food 
stamps—which are now keeping 17 million Americans from 
serious malnutrition—Simon did not explore the reasons 
18 
so many people have joined the program."    She asserted 
that "the simple truth—'More and more people are hungry 
because the economy is getting sicker and sicker'—cannot 
Ibid.  The magazine was Parade. 
Harriet Van Home, "Enemy of the People," The New 
York Post August 13, 1975. 
Ibid. 
62 
be spoken by a Republican Secretary of the Treasuryf* 
Van Home claimed that Simon "dwelt righteously" on the 
20 
"alleged cheating" by food stamp recipients.    She 
admitted that "no doubt there are some ripoffs" because 
of imperfect human nature, but asserted that doctors and 
/ 21 businessmen/in the private sector also act dishonestly. 
Rather, VaA  Home concluded, the "worst thieves" consist 
of grqcrers who raise the price of basic foods purchased 
22 
with food stamps. 
Senator McGovern, chairman of the Senate Select 
Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs, which was engaged 
in a thorough review of the program at the time of 
Simon's speech, challenged Simon's remarks.  In a highly 
charged letter to Simon, McGovern requested "factual and 
data base" of the statements and expected a "retraction 
or some factual substantiation of your Bloomington,attack 
23 
on the Food Stamp Program." 
In an August 31, 1975, article in the Los Angeles 
19T,., Ibid. 
20Ibid. 
Ibid. 
22 z
 Ibid. 
23 U.S., Congress, Senate, Select Committee on 
Nutrition and i*tTm1*n Needs, The Food Stamp Controversy of 
1975, 94th Con^L, 1st sess., 1975, pp. 41-43. 
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Times, Senator McGovern asserted that "the Ford 
Administration has made food stamps part of internal 
Republican politics.  Unable or unwilling to yield to 
rightwing pressures against detente and Vice President 
Rockefeller, the White House apparently has decided that 
sacrificing'food stamps may dampen the incipient revolt 
<*> 
24 from the right." 
McGovern rejected the idea that taxpayers were 
"footing the bill" for^ food stamps for high-income 
families and quoted statistics to justify his claim: "The 
truth, however, is that 77% of food stamp recipients have 
incomes after taxes below $5,000 a year; 92% are below 
$7,000; virtually all earn less than $10,000."25  He 
claimed that the food stamp program contined to be what 
it was supposed to be:  "a low-income program to feed 
those who otherwise cannot afford to feed themselves and 
their families."    He stated that the program had been 
stable with 15 million participants, but that the rise in 
unemployment between August 1974 and June 1975 increased 
the demand for benefits by 30 percent.  According to 
McGovern, millions of Americans "suddenly found 
24 George S. McGovern, "They Help Needy Millions," 
Los Angeles Times, August 31, 1975. 
Ibid. 
26. Ibid. 
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themselves with no or low income.  They appTied"~fof 
stamps—which they had paid taxes to provide for others 
in previous years.  Today the program sustains their 
families through the worst recession since World War 
27 
II. "^ 
In direct reference to Simon's remarks, McGovern 
claimed that the program gtew, "not because the program 
is spiralling out of control, not because 'wild-eyed 
liberals' have created another massive giveaway, not 
because of 'chiselers and rip-off artists,' but because 9 
28 
million Americans are out of work."   McGovern asserted 
that administration officials provoked apprehension over 
the cost of the food stamp program as a "strategy . . . 
29 to suppress the facts." 
McGovern stated that it had never been his intention 
to provide "government subsidies for those who can 
provide for themselves" and admitted that reforms were 
essential to prevent such individuals from participating 
30 in the program.    McGovern suggested the solution to the 
rising costs of the program was the "restoration" of the 
27 
Ibid. 
28TU ■ -, Ibid. 
29 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
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national economy because "the food stamp budget"wiTT 
continue to rise unless the economy offers sufficient 
31 jobs for all who can work. . ."    He strongly criticized 
the Ford administration: 
Yet the Administration which created 
unprecedented unemployment now complains 
because the unemployed need food stamps 
to feed their families. 
Secretary Simon's irresponsible and 
inflammatory remarks about "food stamp 
chiselers and rip-off artists" are simply 
untrue, and he did not offer a single 
statistic to support his statements.  He 
cannot defend his statements because they 
are false. 
These are the facts:  19 million people 
are free from hunger because of food stamps. 
These people are unemployed or poor.  They 
are on food stamps not because they want to 
be, but because they have to be.  Their 
numbers are likely to decline, not increase— 
unless the Administration blunders from  -,„ 
recession into a second Great Depression. 
McGovern concluded his article on an optimistic 
note, yet one which contradicted his earlier remarks: 
Hunger is not a Republican or Democratic 
issue; it need not be an issue between 
the Administration and the Congress.  In- 
stead of making it a political issue, we 
should make food stamps as effective and 
efficient as possible on the basis of 
facts. 
31Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
33 J
 Ibid. 
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Despite McGovern's concluding remarks, dealing with, 
hunger obviously is a partisan issue and an issue between 
the administration and Congress. Clearly, Van Home's and 
McGovern's remarks of August, 1975 demonstrated the 
political problems involved in a reform of the food stamp 
program.  Many of McGovern's references considered the 
condition of the economy under the Republican 
administration and provided an outlet for the antagonism 
that many Democrats in Congress felt for the Ford 
administration. 
Involvement with the food stamp program helped 
McGovern politically; since 1968 he had increased his 
popularity as chairman of the Senate Select Committee on 
Nutrition and Human Needs.  McGovern's nomination in the 
1972 Presidential election reflected his strong position 
in Congress as well as in the Democratic party.  As an 
influential leader in the Democratic party, he now 
emphasized the reasons more Americans turned to the food 
stamp program.   He pointed out the underlying cause of 
the increased use of food stamps—a poor economy which 
the Republicans had helped to create. Republican economic 
practices had increased unemployment and inflation. 
McGovern's comments reflected the attitudes of Americans 
who were dissatisfied with the Ford Administration. 
McGovern employed the issue of food stamps as one way to 
67 
restore public confidence in government and to help gain 
victory for the Democrats in the 1976 election. 
Senator Robert J. Dole (R. Kans.), in an article 
also in the Los Angeles Times on August 31, 1975, summed 
up the feelings of Americans toward the food stamp 
program.  Dole referred to the ignorance about the 
program:  "The program is only one part of the irrational 
web of federal social welfajre programs which few, if any, 
members of Congress understand, which fewer of the needy 
can comprehend, and a decreasing number of taxpayers can 
34 defend."    He called for a "fundamental reexamination of 
.the $135 billion array of social welfare programs with an 
eye toward elimination of many, basic restructuring of 
35 
others, and overall improvement among all programs." 
Such words console, yet frustrate since change is 
difficult to achieve in a program such as food stamps 
whose rapid growth has left it open to abuse. 
Dole noted the disportionate time spent debating the 
food stamp program which he argued was "not surprising in 
light of the fact that it has grown so rapidly during the 
current recession from 14 million participants last 
summer to 19 million today.  Expenditures for the program 
34 Robert J. Dole, "Whole Program Needs An Overhaul," 
Los Angeles Times, August 31, 1975. 
Ibid. 
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amounting to well over half of the total budget of the 
Department of Agriculture."   He remarked that food 
stamps ranked behind Social Security as the Federal 
Government's most expensive social welfare program. 
Dole indicated that criticisms of the program were 
"widespread and wideranging" and that the perception that 
the program was steeped "with fraud and abuse has proved 
37 the most universal irritant."    Dole also referred to a 
recent nutritional study that showed a decline in 
nutritional foods purchased with food stamps and a rise 
38 in foods with low nutritional value.    He recognized the 
drawbacks of the program's operations: 
The surface simplicity of the program 
conceals the bureaucratic and administra- 
tive morass which has led to calls for a 
fundamental restructuring of the food 
stamp law by conservatives and liberals 
alike.  Complex application forms and lax 
eligibility guidelines have permitted 
many non-needy persons to obtain food 
stamps while many truly needy families have 
been forced to wait up to two months to 
obtain assistance to which they are 
entitled. 
Long lines which often form before dawn 
at some urban food stamp application centers 
Ibid. 
37-,.,. . Ibid. 
38 
This study, conducted by Kenneth Clarkson, will be 
discussed later in this chapter. 
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have angered supporters of the program. 
    Mem be^rs—of—€ong^r-es s -arLe--bofflfear-ed—by—iet fce-r-s  
from understandably irate constituents who 
stand in supermarket checkout lines and 
watch their middle-class neighbors pay3|or 
their food with food stamp "currency." 
Dole believed that "top priority" should be given to 
eliminating the system of itemized deductions used to 
ascertain a family's eligibility for participation in the 
food stamp program.  The original purpose of these 
deductions was to overlook part of an applicant's income 
to determine his food purchasing power, but in practice 
they have allowed households which would not be 
40 
considered poor to become eligible for stamps. 
In addition to letting the non-needy participate, 
itemized deduction formulas required an application form 
more complex than the "10 40" income tax return.  In New 
York City, for example, the food stamp application, which 
was six pages long, contained many questions 'and 
calculations for the applicant to complete.  Such a 
lengthy form undoubtedly led to inaccurate payment of 
benefits. 
In conclusion, Dole noted that President* Ford had 
39 Dole, "Whole Program Needs An Overhaul." 
Ibid. „ 
41.. .. Ibid. 
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requested a review of all Federal .social welfare programs 
in an effort to effect consolidation.  He asserted that 
taxpayers deserved efficient use of their tax dollars, 
but moreover that "comprehensive reform" would restore 
the public's faith in government assistance to the 
42 poor. 
Dole's article indicates his political motivation. 
In his middle-of-the-road attitude, Dole tried to appeal 
to both Democrats and.Republicans.  To satisfy liberals, 
he endorsed the elimination of the system of itemized 
deductions and agreed with many Democrats that the blame 
for the rise in program participation rested with the 
economy.  To appeal to conservatives, he recognized that 
the truly poor were not the only recipients of food 
stamps and advocated reform in the food stamp program as 
well as in all welfare programs to maintain more 
equitable eligibility. By admitting change was necessary, 
but not impossible in food stamps, Dole tried to enhance 
his political popularity as well as that of Republicans 
and the Ford administration. 
On a September 7, 1975, broadcast of NBC's "Meet the 
Press," Secretary of the Treasury Simon reiterated his 
views of the food stamp program.  He claimed that "food 
Ibid. 
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stamp'eligibility rules are so loose and so lax that 
43 
virtually anyone can get food stamps." 
In October, 1975, the Ford administration proposed a 
bill which limited eligibility to persons whose income 
stood below the Government's official poverty level.  It 
would also have required recipients to pay 30 percent of 
their net income for stamps, the same proposal that 
Congress "^defeated in February.  This new proposal also 
eliminated the automatic food stamp eligibility of 
welfare recipients.  Other bills introduced in Congress 
embraced stricter or looser eligibility requirements than 
the administration bill, but they all attempted to 
tighten up the program. 
Participation levels dropped to 18.7 million by the 
end of 1975. At the same time, the Agriculture Department 
revealed reports of food stamp vendors who withheld 
Government funds.  Despite these revelations, action on a 
major reform of the food stamp program failed to 
materialize in Congress. 
By 1975, the growth in the program was astounding. 
The food stamp program grew from the smallest to the 
largest of the Federal food programs.  It increased over 
43 
"Lies and Distortions Mark Food Stamp Attack," CNI 
Weekly Report (September 11, 1975), p. 3. 
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tenfold from fiscal year 1969 to 19/4. /From fiscal year" 
1965 to 1974, the number of participants swelled from 
45 424,000 to 13,536,000, a 3,090 percent increase. 
Federal and state attempts to extend participation 
contributed to the rise.  Many interest groups, civic 
organizations and individuals had argued that food stamps 
did not reach enough people. Therefore, primarily through 
the 1971, 1973, and 1974 legislation, Congress expanded 
46 the program into a nationwide initiative. 
In addition, increased benefits for participants 
raised the cost of the program.  Lowered purchase 
requirements,raised the average bonus from 61 percent in 
47 fiscal 1965 to 137 percent in fiscal 1974.    This and 
other Federal and state action resulted in an 
eighty-three fold increase in the food stamp bonus from 
fiscal 1965 to fiscal 1974.  In the same period, the 
program extended from 100 to 2,818 communities.  From 
fiscal 1969 to 1974 the cost of food stamps rose from 
44 Clarkson, p. 19.  See Appendix, Table 2. 
45 Clarkson, p. 19. 
46 See Chapter I. 
47 The bonus portion of food stamps was the 
difference between the face value of the stamps (their 
purchasing power) and the cost of the stamps to the 
participant. For example, a family of four with a monthly 
net income of $140 paid $41 for $154 worth of food 
stamps.  This bonus was $113 or 73 percent. See Appendix, 
Table 1. 
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48      -    — $251 million to 3 billion. 
To determine the nutritional benefits of the program 
to participants, the Department of Agriculture conducted 
three studies.  The first study, conducted from 1969 to 
1971 in rural Pennsylvania, examined whether the diets of 
low-income families improved when they participated in 
one of the Department's food aid plans.  The study 
concluded that families who participated in the food 
stamp program gained nutritional benefits when at least 
two weeks had passed since a family obtained its monthly 
income.  Iron and thiamine intakes improved most 
49 
significantly. 
In 1973, a second study analyzed the characteristics 
of low-income families who participated in the 
Department's Expanded Food and Nutrition Education 
program in comparison to families who did or did not also 
participate in the USDA's food assistance programs.  The 
study also assessed food consumption practices an dietary 
adequacy of participants.  Results showed that families 
who received food stamps had better diets than families 
Clarkson, pp. 19-20. 
49 J.P. Madden and M.D. Yoder, Program Evaluation: 
Food Stamps and Commodity Distribution in Rural Areas of 
Central Pennsylvania.  Final Report from the Pennsylvania 
State University, Department of Agricultural Economics 
and rural Sociology, 1971 in 10 September 1977, 
Congressional Record 121: 28415.  Protein, phosphorous, 
riboflavin, and niacin levels also improved. 
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in the direct distribution program and persons eligible 
for, but not participating in a food assistance program. 
Because of similar per person expenditures of 
participants and nonparticipants, the study concluded 
that the better diets reflected benefits from the food 
50 
stamp program. 
A 1974 study by Sylvia Lane of the University of 
California at Davis contrasted food consumption and 
nutritional adequacy of participants of food assistance 
programs with those of nonparticipants. Results indicated 
that participants in the food stamp program appeared to 
be nutritionally superior to diets of comparable 
51 
nonparticipating, low-income families. 
The three preceding studies, conducted under the 
auspices of the Agriculture Department disclosed 
beneficial nutritional effects associated with 
participation in the food stamp program.  In addition, 
they coincided with Department projections of improved 
50 J.G. Feaster and G.B. Perkins, Families in the 
Expanded Food and Nutrition Education Program: Comparison 
of Food Stamp and Food Distribution Program Participants 
and Nonparticipants.  USDA Agricultural Economic Report 
No. 246, 1973 in 10 September 1975, Congressional Record 
121: 28415. 
Sylvia Lane, Food-Aid program Effects on Food 
Expenditures and Levels of Nutritional Achievement of 
Low-Income Households.  Paper presented at American 
Agricultural Economics Association Annual Meeting, 
College Station, Texas, August, 1974 in 10 Sept. 1975, 
Congressional Record 121: 28415. 
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nutritional levels and increased consumption made when 
the pilot project began in 1961. 
Contrastingly, in a 1975 nutrition study conducted 
by Kenneth Clarkson for the American Enterpris Institute 
of Public Policy Research, a right-wing think tank, other 
conclusions emerged.  Clarkson, an economist from the 
University of Virginia, found no evidence that food 
stamps improve the nutrition of participating households. 
He reported that program beneficiaries increased their 
purchases of soft drinks and other foods of low 
nutritional value.  He revealed that in Fayette County, 
Pennsylvania, the nutritional levels of food stamp users 
actually declined because families bought fewer milk 
products, eggs, and grains and more sweets and fatty 
e      *       52 foods. 
Several Congressional attempts to establish more 
stringent controls on what types of foods participants 
can purchase with food stamps have failed. Legislation on 
junk food has usually been defeated on the basis of one's 
personal liberty to choose one's own purchases. 
Representative Ronald Dellums (D. Calif.) argued against 
the prohibition of the purchase of certain foods on the 
grounds of "freedom of choice" within "the framework of 
52 Clarkson, pp. 49-50.  Fayette County, Pa. had been 
one of the original pilot projects in 1961. 
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the democratic processT""^ "He" assertea™thar^nc5~DTie'-tH±-Is   
a Congressmen not to buy Twinkies and soda pop even 
54 though Federal funds provide his salary. 
By the end of 1975, Americans viewed the food stamp 
program with disfavor as participation and costs 
increased.  Plagued with administrative and bureaucratic 
problems, enthusiasm for this public program dwindled. 
What had gone wrong in the permanent food stamp program, 
one which had destroyed a genuine enthusiasm for the 
pilot program?  The Clarkson study concluded that 
basically the food stamp problems occurred because the 
permanent program did not repeat the conditions of the 
pilot projects.  In the pilot projects a greater 
educational effort helped participants provide a 
well-balanced diet.  Better enforcement of regulations, 
the study noted, prevented violations of program 
operations.  The smaller bonus portion of stamps in the 
pilot projects eliminated the not-so-needy. Moreover, the 
pilot program's small scope limited the chance of 
e        A   55 fraud. 
53 U.S., Congress, House, Rep. Dellums speaking 
against prohibiting junk food purchases with food stamps, 
95th Cong., 1st sess., 27 July 1977, Congressional Record 
123: 25213. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Clarkson, pp. 11-12. 
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Others, however, noted in 1975 that Secretary of 
Agriculture Earl Butz' resistance to food stamps 
contributed to the program's problems.  Again, party 
politics played a role.  Butz' critics felt "deliberate . 
maladministration" kept participation too low by making 
program rules ambiguous and by slighting "outreach" 
programs.    Although some blamed administration 
philosophy and Department of Agriculture action, 
Congressional directives also contributed to the 
program's troubles.  Critics argued that program 
legislation remained vague and lacked detail.  For 
example, the Department of Agriculture could set the 
participant's cost of food stamps at a rate deemed a 
"reasonable investment on the part of the household"; the 
Department extended the program "to those households 
whose income and resources are determined to be 
substantially limiting factors in permitting them to 
57 purchase a nutritionally adequate diet."    This wording, 
supporters of the food stamp program maintained, allowed 
an administration unfavorable to food stamps to exclude 
many in want of the program's benefits. 
Clearly, the food stamp program reached a crescendo 
William Chapman, "Food Stamps: Too Little for Too 
Few," The Progressive 39 (May 1975): 25. 
57. Ibid., p.26. 
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by 1975.  Although__jp_st goverMiLt offimaLs recognLzed a_. 
need for change in the program, the extremes in reform 
were vast.  While the Ford administration felt the 
program's operations should be trimmed, liberal 
supporters of food stamps believed the program itself 
should be modified and interpreted so that it might be a 
more equitable system of welfare relief, extending aid to 
all those who might need it. 
79 
CHAPTER III 
As noted previously, the rise in program 
participation in the mid-1970's coincided with reports of 
cheating, bootlegging of stamps, increasing numbers of 
ineligible participants and overpayments to eligible 
participants. Though conscious of its cost, supporters of 
the program defended food stamps against accusations of 
fraud.  While recognizing that fraud did exist, some 
supporters considered it quite rare. 
Specifically, food stamp program abuse lies in three 
areas:  unintentional and deliberate misrepresentation by 
households at time of application, errors by agencies 
administering the program and issuing stamps, and 
infractions in the circulation of the stamps themselves. 
Although the Department of Agriculture has a system of 
quality control, detection of food stamp fraud is 
difficult and likelihood of prosecution remains small. 
Based on quality control tests, problems in 
Carolyn Mathiasen, ed., Congressional Quarterly 
Almanac, 1976 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly 
Inc., 1977), p. 607. 
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administration and management appear the most wasteful. 
Of a sample of food stamp applications reviewed by 
quality control from July to December 1974, 28.5 percent 
issued an incorrect amount of stamps, with household 
eligibility and stamp overissuing cited as the primary 
c* 2 offenses. 
In addition to obstacles in its operation, the 
nature of the food stamp program contributes to its 
troubles.  Because with food stamps participants receive 
more goods than they would with cash, "trafficking" in 
3 
food stamps is more liable to occur.   Trafficking, the 
direct selling of stamps for cash or the trading of 
stamps for nonfood items, has been hard to control.  The 
U.S. attorney's office revealed that food stamps have 
been used to obtain such things as minibikes, 
4 
automobiles, and car repairs. 
The Office of the Inspector General of the 
Department of Agriculture has also delineated sixty other 
problems in the operation of the food stamp program. Food 
stores' activities accounted for over half of the 
2 
MacDonald, pp. 39-44. 
3 
Clarkson, pp. 31-32. Under a system of cash grants, 
participants do not receive the specific purchasing power 
of food stamps. 
4 
Clarkson, pp. 31-32; "Food Stamps Traded for Cash, 
U.S. Says," Washington Post, January 12, 1973. 
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 violations in program operations, including sales of 
prohibited items, purchases of food stamps for cash, and 
the return of improper cash change.  The remainder 
involved problems of certification, ineligible 
participants, and misrepresented data; irregularities in 
operating procedures and inventory; and the losses, 
thefts, counterfeiting, and inadequate security of the 
5 
stamps themselves. 
The fraudulent obtainment of food stamps by 
recipients, involving the deliberate misrepresentation of 
facts at the time of application, included 73,238 
households with a cost of $16,327,303 from fiscal 1972 to 
fiscal 1975.  The cost of noncompliance with issuance 
rules or "gross negligence" from may 1970 to April 1975 
in nine localities totalled $1,492,554.  During fiscal 
years 1974 and 1975, 53 detected cases of fraud by 
issuance personnel cost $550,000. 
Most fraud (unlike waste) occurs in the circulation 
U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on 
Agriculture-Environmental and Consumer Protection, 
Hearings on Appropriations for Fiscal year 1974, Part 3, 
pp. 637-643 Cited in Clarkso'n, p. 32; See also U.S., 
Congress, Senate, Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, 
Food Stamp Vendor Fraud (1976). 
Richard L. Peltner (1975) Statement before the 
Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry.  U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of Agriculture.  Washington, D.C., pp. 151-158 
Cited in MacDonald, pp. 42-43. 
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of stamps.  Although a computer system and field 
representatives police food stamp operations, grocery 
stores and stamp vendors' illegal gain from the prograni^^ 
often goes undetected.  As of July 1975, 249,000 food 
stores were authorized to accept stamps.  During fiscal 
1975, 747 firms were disqualified for various periods of 
7 
time for infractions of program regulations.   A 
Department of Agriculture audit in 1976 reported that 
food stamp vendors misused more than $34 million of the 
money that had been collected from food stamps by making 
late deposits, no deposits or using funds for private 
4-     \ 8 investments. 
By 1976, many in Congress felt that changes should 
be made in the food stamp program.  Business groups, such 
as the National Association of Manufacturers, called for 
tighter restrictions.  At the same time, welfare groups 
and labor unions continued to defend food stamps as a 
viable way to feed the needy.  AFI-CIO President George 
Meany felt a deliberate attack was being waged using 
"half-truths and outright lies to picture the food stamps 
7 
MacDonald, pp. 47-48. 
Q 
Carolyn Mathiasen, ed., Congressional Quarterly 
Almanac, 1977 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 
Inc., 1978), p. 458. 
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as a runaway program replete with abuses and cheating." 
The real culprit, Meany said was "the Nixon-Ford economic 
policies which have caused massive unemployment and 
skyrocketing food prices." 
Despite more than 200 reform bills introduced in the 
94th Congress and despite months of legislative work, 
Congress did not drastically alter the program in 1976. 
The only legislation Congress passed imposed stricter 
controls on vendors and provided jail sentences of up to 
ten years for vendors found to be using food stamp funds 
for their own purposes.  Efforts to pass a broader food 
stamp bill in 1976 failed.  Authorization for the food 
stamp program, to expire September 30, 1977, left it to 
the 95th Congress to reform the program. 
Figures released July 15, 1977, by the Agriculture 
Department and the General Accounting Office (GAO) 
revealed that participation in the food stamp program was 
at its lowest point in two and a half years; during May 
1977, 16.7 million people received food stamps, 
participation had been 16.1 million people in November, 
9 
Mathiasen, ed., Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 
1976, p. 607. 
10T, ., Ibid. 
Ibid.  Public Law 94-339, Statutes at Large 90, 
Sec. 6 , 546 . 
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1974, had risen to 11.1 million TTTlDec ember, 1974'", "and 
then had peaked at 19.6 million in April, 1975. 
Supporters of food stamps, tired of criticism during the 
peak participation periods that the program was 
unmanageable, indicated that these new figures reflected 
improved economic conditions under the Carter 
administration. 
Nevertheless, the GAO reported that the Government 
lost $590 million each year in food stamp overpayments. 
These overpayments resulted from administrative errors, 
misunderstandings by applicants regarding the information 
they were required to provide, or fraud. In five of eight 
projects surveyed, 55 percent of overpayments resulted . 
from fraud.  Agriculture Department officials, however, 
insisted that the figure did not represent the entire 
program because the GAO collected most of its information 
at offices in high crime areas such as Detroit, 
13 Cleveland, Philadelphia, and Oakland. 
On September 16, 1977, Congress finally passed 
legislation that significantly revised the operation of 
12 Mathiasen, ed., Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 
1977, p. 468.  Total costs, however, continued to climb 
due to rising food prices and increased administrative 
costs of the program. 
Mathiasen, ed., Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 
1977, p. 468. 
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the food stamp program. This major reform effort occurred 
because the political friction of the preceding two years 
had lessened considerably. With the defeat of Ford in the 
1976 Presidential election and the entrance of a 
Democratic president, partisan politics decreased.  The 
Democratically-controlled Congress also had the support 
of the Carter administration for reform.  This backing 
included Robert Greenstein, a former official of the 
Community Nutrition Institute, a food stamp advisory 
group, who acted as a special assistant to Agriculture 
Secretary Bob Bergland. 
Also, by 1977, the decrease in participation in the 
food stamp program promoted a more rational environment 
for reform.  Studies by the House Agriculture Committee 
and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) indicated that 
most recipients were indeed poor.  The CBO reported that 
in September, 1975, 86 percent of all benefits went to 
families below the poverty level and 95 percent went to 
14 families below 125 percent of the poverty level. 
Thus, it became clear to many Congressmen at this 
time that it would not be possible to drastically cut 
funding to the program without hurting the truly needy. A 
consensus arose in Congress, however, that to reform its 
Ibid. 
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fraud, abuse and administrative snags, a reform of the 
food stamp program seemed essential.  Thus, the goal of 
the 1977 revision was to increase the program's 
efficiency while eliminating ineligible participants. 
Carol Tucker Foreman, Assistant Agriculture Secretary for 
Food and Consumer Goods, summed up the goals of the 1977 
revisions:  "We believe the new food stamp legislation 
will substantially improve administration of the program. 
It will make food stamps available to those most in need 
15 
and will eliminate those least in need." 
The significant change that Congress made was the 
elimination of the requirement that participants buy 
their food stamps.  Anti-hunger groups, welfare 
administrators, and some Congressmen had advocated free 
stamps for several years, but such a proposal did not 
have the support of the President until 1977.  Supporters 
of free stamps had argued that the purchase requirement 
barred the truly needy from participation because they 
were not able to save the money needed to obtain stamps. 
Because of this requirement, advocates of free stamps 
contended, only 50 percent of those eligible for stamps 
actually participated. 
While eliminating the purchase requirement, the 1977 
15Ibid., p. 457 
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bill provided that the value of a household's food stamp 
allotment would be equal to the cost of the "Thrifty Food 
Plan" reduced by an amount equal to 30 percent of the 
household's net income.    Congress set the minimum 
benefit for single persons and two person households at 
$10 monthly and required that the Secretary of 
Agriculture to report to Congress (six months after the 
law went into effect) on the results of the elimination 
of the purchase requirement and to report annually 
t,     ...   17 thereafter. 
The elimination of the purchase requirement took out 
of circulation $3 billion in stamps sold by 15,000 
vendors consisting of banks, post offices, fire stations, 
churches, and corner stores.  The change also eliminated 
$3 billion in cash transactions, reducing the chances for 
fraud and theft. Administrative costs were expected to be 
18 trimmed by $25 million to $50 million. 
As the most significant change in the food stamp 
reform bill, the elimination of the purchase requirement 
The "Thrifty Food Plan" was a Government 
publication that gave nutritional advice and suggestions 
for food to be purchased with food stamps. 
17 Food and Agriculture Act of 1977, Statutes at 
Large .91, Sec. 8, 968. 
18 Mathiasen, ed., Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 
1977, p. 457. 
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"was The Topic of much debate in both the House and 
Senate.  The Senate Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry 
Committee, despite the opposition of Chairman Herman E. 
Talmadge (D. Ga.), voted 11-6 in favor of eliminating the 
purchase requirement.  The committee argued in favor of 
the elimination of the purchase requirement in order to 
make the program available to many low income families 
"who have never been able to put together the cash 
required to buy into the program" as well as to produce 
fewer accounting problems while reducing the number of 
food stamps that had to be printed, shipped, stored, 
19 issued and redeemed. 
Much discussion on the Senate floor surrounded the 
elimination, of the purchase requirement.  Carl T. Curtis 
(R. Neb.) argued in favor of restoring the purchase 
requirement.  Curtis believed that elimination of the 
purchase requirement would cost more than estimated.  He 
also asserted that it would permit errant parents to 
spend a greater portion of their income "on liquor, on 
dope, what not," rather than on-nutritious meals for 
19 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Agriculture 
and Forestry, Food and Agriculture Act of 1977, S Rept 
180 to accompany S 275, 95th Cong., 1st sess., 1977, p. 
214. 
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20 their children.    He commented on the extensive lobbying 
by nutrition, welfare, and church groups in support of 
doing away with the purchase price: 
It would have been worthwhile if the 
entire Senate could have been in the 
Agriculture Committee Room when this 
subject was considered.  The place was 
so full of lobbyists that one could not 
get to his chair—the hungry marchers, 
lobbyists from all types of groups. 
They wore badges; "EPR," Eliminate the 
Purchase Requirements.  Arguments? No. 
Supporting facts?  No. Pressures. 
Emotions . . . These pressure groups 
who invaded that room wearing their 
badges . . . would have us believe that 
poor people of no income could not get    „, 
food stamps.  But this is not true at all. 
Senator Talmadge agreed that eliminating the purchase 
requirement would make the food stamp program "vastly 
22 
more expensive."   He remarked that "there is absolutely 
no justification for continuing a welfare program under 
20 U.S., Congress, Senate, Senator Curtis speaking in 
favor of the restoration of the purchase requirement, 
95th Cong., 1st sess., 24 May 1977, Congressional Record 
123: 16303.  Because participants no longer contributed 
part of their disposble incomes to acquire food stamps, 
it was feared that the additional household income would 
be ill-spent, thereby negating the social benefits of the 
program while increasing government costs. 
21 U.S., Congress, Senate, Senator Curtis speaking in 
favor of the restoration of the purchase requirement, 
95th Cong., 1st sess., 24 May 1977, Congressional Record 
123: 16303. 
22 U.S., Congress, Senate, Senator Talmadge speaking 
on the elimination of the purchase requirement, 95th 
Cong., 1st sess., 24 May 1977, Congressional Record 123: 
16304. 
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23 the guise of a nutrition program, with stamps."   He 
proposed welfare reform at "the earliest opportunity, and" 
24 the payment of a cash supplement instead of stamps. 
On the other side of the issue, however, Robert Dole 
(R. Kans.), a proponent eliminating the purchase 
requirement, referred to a CBO estimate that put the cost 
of free stamps at $540 million in fiscal 1978, instead of 
25 the $2 billion predicted by Curtis and Talmadge. 
Like the Senate, the House Agriculture Committee's 
biggest change in the food stamp program was elimination 
of the purchase requirement. The committee asserted, "The 
major value of EPR (eliminating the purchase requirement) 
is that it will improve program access for the needy. EPR 
in combination with the other parts of the bill results 
in a major shifting of benefits from those above the 
poverty line to those whose incomes are below the poverty 
line and who have been previously eligible but have not 
23 U.S., Congress, Senate, Senator Talmadge speaking 
on the food stamp program as a welfare 'program, 95th 
Cong., 1st sess., 24 May 1977, Congressional Record 123: 
16304-16305. 
24 U.S., Congress, Senate, Senator Talmadge speaking 
for welfare reform, 95th Cong., 1st sess., 24 May 1977, 
Congressional Record 123: 16304. 
 j_*  
25 U.S., Congress, Senate, Senator Dole speaking for 
the elimination of the purchase requirement, 95th Cong., 
1st sess., 24 May 1977, Congressional Record 123: 16305. 
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participated."    Eight Republican committee members 
argued against free stamps, asserting that eliminating 
the purchase requirement would decrease the amount of 
money a family would spend on food and thus lessen its 
chances of having a nutritionally adequate diet as well 
as cut farm product consumption.  Referring to a CBO 
study, they said that if stamps were free, food purchases 
would decline by $1 billion and nonfood consumption would 
27 increase by $1.5 billion. 
Committee member Steven D. Symms (R. Ida.), whose 
amendment to restore the purchase price was defeated, 
argued on the House floor that free stamps "would all but 
eliminate the nutritional focus of- the food stamp 
program, substantially transforming £itJinto an 
28 
all-purpose supplement."   He also entitled the measure a 
26 x U.S., Congress, House, Food Stamp Act of 1977, 
H.R. 464, 95th Cong., 1st sess., p. 4. 
27 Ibid., pp. 841-453. The eight Republican committee 
members who argued against free stamps included: Wampler, 
Seblius, Symms, Kelly, Grassley, Hagedorn, Coleman, and 
Marlenee. 
28 U.S., Congress, House, Rep. Symms offering 
amendment to restore the purchase requirement, 95th 
Cong., 1st sess., 27 July 1977, Congressional Record 123: 
25239.  The amendment was defeated, 317 nays to 102 ayes. 
U.S., Congress, House, Vote on Symms amendment, 95th 
Cong., 2st sess., 27 July 1977, Congressional Record 123: 
25248. U.S., Congress, House, Rep. Symms speaking against 
elimination of the purchase requirement, 95th Cong., 1st 
sess., 27 July 1977, Congressional Record 123: 25239. 
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29 
"budget buster . "^_ _   In a'ddi tion, Symms be 11 ey ed__that 
administrative savings cited by proponents appeared 
over-estimated, asserted that free stamps would increase 
the welfare stigma of the program, and called free stamps 
"a back door approach" to doing away with stamps entirely 
in favor of.an annual income supplement. 
In response to such minority views, the House 
Agriculture Committee cited an HEW survey which showed 
that 63 percent of recipients who bought their full 
allotment of stamps spent additional money on food.  The 
committee defended its position: 
While food expenditures might, 
therefore, decline for as many as 3 to 
4 million people currently in the 
program, they would increase for the 
additional 2 t&  3 million people who 
will enter the program.  On balance, 
therefore, the impact on food expenditures 
is likely to be relatively insignificant 
and the impact on farm income even less 
significant. 
Chairman of the House Agriculture Subcommittee that 
drafted the food stamp revisions, Frederick Richmond (D. 
N.Y.) said that the elimination of the purchase 
29 U.S., Congress, House, Rep. Symms speaking against 
elimination of the purchase requirement, 95th Cong., 1st 
sess., 27 July 1977, Congressional Record 123: 25241. 
30Ibid. 
31 U.S., Congress, House, Food Stamp Act of 1977, 
H.R. 464, 95th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 433-434. 
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requirement would increase accessibility, eliminate 
vendor fraud, streamline administration, decrease the 
t 
cost of administration and reduce black-marketing of 
32 • 
stamps.   He concluded, "Let us think of the bottom line. 
By eliminating the purchase requirement, we allow very 
poor people in the United States to fully participate in 
33 the food stamp program." 
Besides elimination of the purchase requirement, the 
1977 law revised, amended, and added regulations and 
procedures in the operation of the food stamp program. 
The law extended authorization, set spending limits, and 
specified certification periods for participating 
households.  It set eligibility standards according to 
income and simplified the deduction system in an effort 
to curb error. It also tightened eligibility requirements 
for students and aliens. 
To minimize abuse in the food stamp program, the 
bill also provided for measures to simplify 
administration of the program. It specified penalties and 
outlined procedures to increase the likelihood of 
prosecution of fraud.  This 1977 revision also authorized 
32 U.S., Congress, House, Rep. Richmond speaking for 
elimination of the purchase requirement, 95th Cong., 1st 
sess., 27 July 1977, Congressional Record 123: 25241. 
33 Ibid. 
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ir 
research "for   improvement  of^ttre  program  rn  both- its  
effectiveness of administration and its success in 
. .      34 delivering nutritional benefits to participants. 
Despite the massive reform of the food stamp program 
in 1977, the operation and administration of the program 
has continued to the present to be plagued with the same 
problems that existed before the overhaul.  In spite of 
efforts to curb fraud, food stamps continue to the 
present to be the means through which stores, 
individuals, and participants defraud the Federal 
Government.  At the same time the Congressional "Abscam" 
scandal occurred, Agriculture Department officials 
disguised as stealers of stolen food stamps participated 
in their own "sting" operation which uncovered a network 
of grocery stores that converted large amounts of food 
35 
stamps into cash.    In September, 1981, an ABC TV news 
magazine, "20/20," chronicled the illegal food stamp 
activities of grocery stores.  It implied that the 
stealing and blackmarketing of authorization cards was so 
extensive that Federal authorities could not keep up with 
34 Food and Agricultural Act of 1977, Statutes at 
Large 91, Sees. 3-18, pp. 958-979. 
35 
"Food Stamp Sting," Congressional Quarterly Weekly 
Report 38 (February 9, 1980): 348. 
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the backlog of investigations. 
Since 1977 the costs of the food stamp program have 
greatly increased due to the elimination of the purchase 
requirement.  Although the Government had estimated that 
tightened eligibility standards would decrease the number 
of unneedy participants and thus decrease costs, in 
reality this has not happened.  There has been a 
tremendous increase of new participants.  A 1979 
Agriculture Department survey revealed figures which 
showed the elderly and rural residents constitute the 
bulk of the new participants.  The figures were larger 
than anticipated; new participants greatly outnumbered 
those persons eliminated by the "tightened" eligibility- 
37 
of the 1977 reform.    The program has, therefore, become 
more costly than before the reform law.  Since 1978 costs 
have risen an average of $1.5 billion a year.  With 
expenditures averaging ten .billion in 1981, costs will 
38 have increased 82 percent in three years.    In 1979 and 
36ABC TV, "20/20," September 3, 1981. 
37 U.S., Department of Agriculture, Characteristics 
of Food gtamp Households: November 1979 (Washington, 
D.C.: Office of Public Policy, Planning and Evaluation 
Food and Nutrition Service, June 1981), p. 11. 
38 Harrison Donnelly, "Food Stamp Costs Head -f"o"r $10 
Billion Mark," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 38 
(January 26, 1980): 192. 
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1980 with the program on the verge of running out of 
funds, emergency efforts by Congress kept the program 
39 from decreasing benefits to its participants. 
The food stamp program, then, emerged in the 1980's 
still beset with bureaucratic problems.  There does 
appear, however, to be some hope to bring the program 
under control.  In July, 1981, Congress approved cuts in 
the program that exceeded those proposed by President 
Reagan as part of his general budget cutting effort. Such 
measures seem natural in light of the fact that millions 
of dollars of Federal funds never reach those honestly in 
need of assistance.  Reagan's proposal, incorporated in 
his 1982 State of the Union message, to have the states 
take over food stamps, might be the most equitable 
solution.  Perhaps the states have become unconsciously 
careless in their administration and enforcement of the 
c 
food stamp program because this huge and costly program 
does not involve state funds.  Rather, the food stamp 
initiative is only one of many Federally-funded welfare 
program that states administer.  With decentralization it 
39 Harrison Donnelly, "House Panel Approves Emergency 
Spending Hike for Food Stamps," Congressional Quarterly 
Weekly Report 37 (May 12, 1979): 932; Harrison Donnelly, 
"House Acts to Prevent Food Stamp Cut Off," Congressional 
Quarterly Weekly Report 38 (May 10, 1980): 1293; Harrison 
Donnelly, "Extra 2.6 Billion Voted for Food Stamps," 
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 38 (May 17, 1980). 
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seems more likely^ttratrthe states would enforce stri-e-trer 
eligibility standards and participants would be persons 
who are truly in need of an improved diet.  In any case, 
only time will tell the direction of the food stamp 
program in the decades ahead., 
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CONCLUSION 
From 1939 to the early 1980's the food stamp program 
changed measurably.  The primary benefits of food stamps 
shifted from farmers to needy Americans.  The goals and 
responsibilities of the program have therefore been 
altered.  Essentially, as America recognizes its economic 
and social problems, its representatives in Government 
respond.  Leaders have employed policies that have 
reflected society's changing attitudes toward the poor. 
The New Deal of the 1930's, with its liberal 
approach to the problems of the nation, gave way to a 
post-war and 1950's conservatism under the Eisenhower 
administrations.  Under President kennedy a new breed of 
liberals emerged who dominated Congress in the 1960's and 
early 1970's.  In the 1980's a new conservative spirit 
appears to be resurging.  With these political shifts the 
idea of a food stamp program has been modified. 
Politically, the differences in Republican and 
Democratic philosophy during the past forty years have 
guided the direction of the food stamp program.  The 
liberal New Deal legislation of a Democratic 
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administration brought the food stamp concept into  
practice.  In the 1950's, however, with America's renewed 
ultraconservatism under two successive Republican 
administrations, Congressional support of a food stamp 
program  remained minimal. Even though some legislators 
proposed the necessary bills, Congress did not pass 
legislation authorizing a food stamp plan.  Under the 
leadership of John F. Kennedy, in the early I9601 s 
liberal Democrats in Congress found a political ally. 
Thus, beginning with Kennedy's executive order, the food 
stamp program found a solid base of Democratic support 
not only in the administration, but also in Congress. 
This liberal support of the food stamp program 
continued into the 1970's.  Partisan politics under the 
Republican administrations of both Nixon and Ford colored 
the food stamp legislation, however, despite Nixon's 
endorsement of an expanded food stamp program. 
Politically, Nixon realized that liberals in Congress 
(botfy Democrats and Republicans) and many Americans 
believed the benefits of food stamps should reach more of 
the needy.  Thus, involvement with the program proved to 
be a means of achieving political recognition.  When 
public approval of the program was high, politicians 
embraced it.  When its popularity plummeted, politicians 
attacked it, often placing blame for its troubles on 
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rival party philosophy and advocating reform of the 
program to enhance their own position. 
The Food Stamp Act of 1977 symbolized both the 
liberal desire for a food stamp program by the Democratic 
Congress and administration as well as recognition by 
both liberals and conservatives in Congress that reform 
was necessary in the program. A growing conservative mood 
appeared to take root in the 1980's as a Republican 
majority in the Senate, increased Republican seats in the 
House, and a Republican president emerged in the 1980 
elections.  In this light, many questioned the burgeoning 
of all Federal programs, including food stamps.  The cuts 
in the food stamp program operations in 1981 and 1982 
reflected the philosophy of the Reagan administration and 
its support in Congress. 
The popularity of the food stamp program also 
reflected public attitudes as well as the economy. 
Government aid to ease the severe hardships of the 1930's 
was well regarded by Americans.  They welcomed Federal 
economic policies as just and right intervention in the 
marketplace.  As part of the New Deal efforts to help 
Americans, the food stamp program in 19 39 was one way to 
improve the condition of the American farmer.  The 
post-war years and the 1950's, however, were prosperous 
for most Americans.  Under such affluence people frowned 
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upon too much Government intervention in the economy; 
they believed interference was unnecessary and possibly 
harmful to business.  The food stamp program legislation 
in 1939 had primarily been a means to help the farmer 
economically.  By the 1950's it was no longer needed. 
Furthermore with increased technology the middle-class 
American farmer enjoyed a high standard of life and a 
decent income. 
In the 1960's, while the farmers remained basically 
contented, groups in support of subsidizing the needy and 
helping the poor increased dramatically.  These welfare 
interest groups created an awareness of the problems of 
the needy and hungry in the United States: Americans were 
discovering poverty.  Extensive lobbying by and media 
coverage of these groups exposed to the American public a 
need for efficient Federal food assistance programs. 
Obviously, poverty legislation could more readily gain 
support if the economy appeared in good shape.  Because 
the 1960's and early 1970's witnessed favorable economies 
(despite Vietnam-induced inflation) the public reacted 
positively to the food stamp program.  By the late 1960's 
with their increased strength, these welfare interest 
groups gained a political base of support which 
overpowered that of the farmer.  Hence, political power 
moved from the midwestern and southern rural Congressmen 
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_who_represented farming interests in the northern and 
urban Congressmen who represented welfare interests. 
The unsettled economy of the United States from the 
mid-1970's to the present has caused many Americans, who 
once favored the food stamp program, to reassess its 
contribution to society.  When the public became aware of 
the exorbitant costs of the program, enthusiasm dwindled 
quickly.  By the late 1970's, in addition, it was obvious 
that the bureaucratic nature of the program contributed 
to its proble'mV*  At closer look the food stamp program 
has paralleled^- changes in the bureaucratic structure 
in all of AmerWi society.  In the early 1940 -g the food 
stamp program was not steeped in a morass of bureaucracy. 
Inevitably, as the bureaucratic structure of the nation 
has grown since the 1960's in particular, so too has the 
food stamp program troubles.  With a new conservatism 
surfacing in the 1980's, directives seem to be aimed at 
cutting the cost of social welfare programs and trimming 
the bureaucratic structure in which fraud and 
inefficiency can thrive.  Although it clearly remains"a 
welfare program, Reagan's proposals concerning the 
operation of the food stamp program have affected the 
program, even if only the rate of its growth is involved. 
in summary, the alterations in the food stamp 
program, including its emphases and operation, have 
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reflected changing bases of political support, 
philosophies of the polical parties, and the condition of 
the economy as well as public awareness.  The food stamp 
program's shift from a price support action for farmers 
to a welfare program for the needy over the last forty 
years has mirrored these elements in American society. 
Although the food stamp program appears entrenched as a 
failing public program, the Reagan administration might 
still effect more adequate reforms of the program.  The 
future remains to be seen. 
"\ 
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V APPENDIX 
TABLE 1 
Number of Persons in Household 
1   2  3  4  56  7  8 
Monthly Food Stamp Allotment 
$46   $48  $122  $154  $182  $210  $238  $266 
Amount Paid For Stamps 
Net Income 
$  0- 19.99 $ o $ o $ o $ o $ o $ o $ o $ o 
50- 59.99 8 10 10 10 11 11 12 12 
100-109.99 18 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 
150-169.99 33 38 40 41 42 43 44 45 
250-269.99 64 70 71 72 73 74 75 
360-389.99 100 104 105 106 107 108 
450-479.99 130 132 133 134 135 
SOURCE: Mathiasen, ed., Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 
p. 678. 
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TABLE 2 
Food Stamp Program Costs 
Billions of Dollars 
6 
HH 
1969  1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976 
(Fiscal Year! 
JUINon-Fei^eral Administrative Costs 
!-"'•)Federal Admin. & Other Costs 
I  I Bonus Costs 
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office 
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